



ISRAEL - AMERICAN RELATIONS (1950-1960)

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
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PREFACE

In the beginning of 1950s America witnessed a tremendous change in its foreign policy formulation, particularly towards the Middle East as Israel after its birth had become an inevitable ally and it became incumbent on the part of the Americans to support the new born state despite the vehement opposition from the Arab world. The very implementation of the American foreign policy in the region was challenged. On the one hand there was a commitment on the part of the U.S. Administration to promote, preserve Israeli interest and on the other, the U.S. economic interests with the Arab world were trying to impede the process of normalisation of relations between America and Israel. An attempt is made in this dissertation to trace the pros and cons that accentuated and obstructed the process of relations between America and Israel from 1950-1960.

The various factors that prompted the birth of Israel have been discussed in Chapter I. The impact of Suez imbroglio on the policies of America and Israel has been dealt in the Chapter II. The role of Jewish lobby in American politics has been delineated in the Chapter III. The economic and military assistance given by America are recorded in the Chapter IV and the Conclusion has pointed out the power of Jews and Jewish lobby, which became inevitable factor to accelerate the process of relations between the two countries.

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**"The Nation which indulges towards another
an habitual hatred or an habitual
fondness is in some degree a slave."**

George Washington

CHAPTER-I

BACK DROP: BIRTH OF ISRAEL

The birth of Israel on May 15, 1948 owes its origin in Zionism - the movement which sprang among the European Jews in the nineteenth century with an effort to encounter the efforts of anti semitism by creating a Jewish nation-state.¹ The term "zionist" is derived from the word "zion", the name of a hill in Jerusalem, which was the site of the royal palace of King David, and his successors and the centre of the Hebrew Government and the place of worship.² The suffering of Jewish community in Europe and elsewhere culminated in the emergence of Zionist movement which aimed to protect the religious, economic, political and social interests of the Jews in the world.³ Until the later part of the nineteenth century, the Jewish interests in Palestine were basically concerned with religious and other humanitarian affairs. This trend, however, was changed because of perpetual financial assistance from the wealthy European Jews and soon the Jews began

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1. P. Saran, Government and Politics of Israel (New Delhi, Metropolitan Book Company Pvt., Ltd., 1983), p. 16.
"Anti-Semitism was the anti-Jewish prejudice which showed itself often socially, but also in the form of discriminatory legislation and at times in form of violence", A.M. Hyamson, A Dictionary of International Affairs (Washington D.C., Public Affairs Press, American Council on Public Affairs, 1947), p. 22
 2. Philip L. Groisser, The United States and the Middle East (New York, Albany, The State University of New York, 1982), p. 116
 3. Dewan Berindranath, War and Peace in East Asia (New Delhi, Topical Publications, 1969), p. 126.

to take political interest in Palestine in the concluding period of the nineteenth century. Political Zionists were those Jews who were determined to contribute for a growth of Jewish state. Leon Pinsker, a Russian Jew was the first to give the idea of a Jewish Nationalism in 1882. But it was Dr. Theodor Herzl, an Austrian Jew and a journalist, who believed that the exodus of Jews from the Diaspora (The Scattering of the Jews to countries outside of Palestine after the Babylonian captivity) and their settlement in a state of Palestine was the only way to tackle the problem of anti-semitism and to ensure a Jewish state. Herzl's book, "The Jewish State" created a sensation among the Jews and urged them to realise their dream of separate homeland in Palestine and his further efforts culminated in convening the first Jewish congress in 1897 in Basle, Switzerland. In the Conference, Herzl declared: "we are here to lay down the foundation-stone of the house which is to shelter the entire Jewish nation." The Jewish Congress passed a resolution for only a home in Palestine for the Jews.

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4. Fred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (New York, Syracuse University Press, 1968), p. 3.
 5. Dewan Berindramath, n. 3, p. 126.
 6. Fred J. Khouri, n. 4, p. 3
 7. Philip L. Groisser, n. 2, p. 116
 8. Fred J. Khouri, n. 4, p. 4
 9. Dewan Berindramath, n. 3, p. 126.
 10. Fred J. Khouri, n. 4, p. 4

Despite their failure to obtain a charter for a separate Jewish State in Palestine from the Ottoman Empire, the then ruler of Palestine, Zionists encouraged the Jews from all over the world to migrate to Palestine and by the end of the first world war their number was 85,000¹¹. Mr Chaim Weizmann, a distinguished British Chemist further shaped the Jewish organisation based on the ideas of Herzl and declared in 1907 that: "political Zionism means to make the Palestine question an international one. It means going to nations and saying to them--we need your help to achieve our aim."¹² Weizmann and Nahum Sokolow, Russian member of the Zionist executive, started their campaign in Britain to secure Zionist aims in Palestine. Weizmann became active in securing the support of the eminent British leaders like Lord Balfour, Milner, Lloyd George, Sir Mark Sykes, and the other intellectuals of Britain. These British leaders supported Weizmann indirectly for the implementation of the Zionist programme in spite of the fact that it would affect the Arabs.¹³ Strangely enough, the Labour Party, which was known for its progressive ideas also lent its support to the Jews. In fact, the pro-Zionist leaders in the Labour Party played a vital role in securing the support to the Jewish cause. The key factor for the acceleration of this movement, was, however, provided by the arch

11. Philip L. Groisser, n. 2, p. 117.

12. Dewan Berindranath, n. 3, p. 127.

13. Fred J. Khouri, n. 4, pp. 4-5.

reactionaries of the capitalists in Britain.

So far as the reasons for British interest in the affairs of Palestine were concerned, it was obvious that by the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, the British aim had been crystallized as the liquidation of the ottoman empire had began, and the establishment of the British suzerainty from the Suez to the south China sea was strengthening. So, on the one hand, Britain made efforts to encourage communal movements in India to thwart the national movement which was accelerating in the beginning of the 20th century, and on the other tried to pierce a dagger in the heart of the Middle East through airing a movement aimed at settling the European population in the area which had become strategically, vulnerable for the British to promote their interests.¹⁴ Weismann's pressure on the British Government to implement the Zionist programme was opposed by the prominent anti-Zionist Jews in Britain because they feared that the demands for a Jewish nation-state would be inconsistent with the desire of Jews elsewhere in the world for equal rights as citizens of¹⁵ the nations in which they were living.

14. Dewan Berindranath, n. 3, p. 128.

15. Fred J. Khouri, n. 4, p. 5.

BALFOUR DECLARATION

The fulfilment of the Zionist goals was facilitated by the various groups and declaration issued by the British foreign secretary Arthur Balfour on November 2, 1917.¹⁶ Weizmann was the person who contributed to the negotiation of the declaration.¹⁷ The Balfour Declaration was in the form of a letter written by the foreign secretary Arthur Balfour to Lord Rothschild as representative of the Zionists. It declared "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or their rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country".¹⁸ This declaration was, however, opposed by some prominent Jews. For instance, C.G. Montefiore, a European Jewish leader pointed out that, "when the Balfour declaration about Palestine was being discussed by the cabinet, the terms were privately submitted to some half-a-dozen Jews, of whom four, if I remember rightly were pronounced or semi-Zionists, and two, of whom I was one, were

16. Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (London: Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 24.

17. Philip L. Grosser, n.2, p. 118.

18. Nadav Safran, n. 16, p. 24.

opposed to zionism. We two ventured to suggest that the words 'the national home for the Jewish people' were likely to cause trouble. We were, it would seem, not so far wrong ... we objected to the words because we denied that the Jews were any longer a nation, and we did not want them even to become a nation again. We claimed and desired, as I and my friends still claim and desire, that they should be free and equal citizens of all the countries in which they lived. We feared that the proposed national home might create far more anti-semitism than it would cure. Our views and objections were, however, not listened to, except that for the definite article 'the' as the draft originally read, the indefinite article 'a' was substituted, so the words now run: 'a national home for the Jewish people.'¹⁹ Michael Adams, an English Journalist while interpreting the Balfour Declaration called the Palestine problem as the offspring of the two contradictory promises made by the British Government - on the one hand, she promised to the Arabs independence from their Turkish masters in 1916 and on the other issued the Balfour Declaration for the establishment of a national home for Jewish people in Palestine. While commenting the Balfour Declaration as ultra vires that was incompatible with the international law, Michael Adams further observed, "there are two points to consider about the phrasing of the Balfour Declaration. The word 'a national home' had obviously been chosen

19. Henry Cattau, Palestine, The Arabs and Israel: The Search for Justice, (London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1969), p. 11.

with care what was intended was some form of refuge, a sanctuary where Jews could escape from the restrictions and sometimes the persecutions to which they were subject in other part of the world."

In 1919, when the Paris Peace Conference was held, Palestine question was raised by the Zionists, who tried their best to get the Balfour Declaration passed, which was already accepted by France, Italy and the United States. The Supreme Council of the Allied Powers at the peace conference witnessed the programme proposed by the Zionists for the fate of Palestine. The central point of the programme was the creation of a national home for the Jews in Palestine leading to an autonomous commonwealth. The focal point of talks between the Zionist organisation and the

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20. "Plainly, the concept which the British Government had in mind was not a Jewish State in Palestine, or it would have said so. In any case only a year earlier Britain had promised that Palestine would form part of an independent Arab State; and even if this promise were to be forgotten or disregarded, it would be patently possible to create a Jewish State in Palestine without prejudicing civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in the country. This phrase provides the other curiosity about the Balfour Declaration. It could only suggest to some one who was unfamiliar with Palestine in 1917, that its population was predominantly Jewish, with some other, and possibly substantial minorities. If this was deliberate, it was a piece of carefully calculated misinterpretation, for it expressed the precise opposite of the truth. On the day when Balfour signed his letter to Lord Rothschild, Jews constituted between 7 & 8 percent of the population of Palestine. That deceptive phrase 'existing non-Jewish communities' meant, in effect, the Arabs, the people whose ancestors had been in uninterrupted occupation of Palestine for 1,300 years and who in 1917, constituted more than 90 per cent of the population and owned 97.5 per cent of the land. These were the unfortunates whose 'civil and religious rights' the British pledged itself to protect by the terms of the Balfour Declaration." Ibid., p. 13.

British delegates was the Palestine mandate to be granted. No doubt, the Zionists had a grand accomplishment at the cost of the Arabs, particularly, the Palestinians who were even unwanted²¹ and uninvited at the Conference. The proposal of President Woodrow Wilson of America, for the proceeding of inter-allied commission to Syria and Palestine to determine their future settlement was materialised by the Supreme Council²² of the allied powers by appointing the two Americans as members of the Commission. They were Henry C. King and Charles R. Crane, who visited Middle East for inquiry. The report of the King-Crane Commission reflected the injustice done in the enforcement of the Balfour Declaration. It also stressed that the claim of Zionists to Palestine was baseless. The Commission found that the Zionist programme could be materialised only through force and aggression.²³

But the recommendations of the King-Crane Commission were hidden and did not reveal to the public. The denial of the Supreme Council of the allied powers to Zionists programme for the setting

21. Ibid., pp. 14-15.

22. Ralph H. Magnus (ed), Documents on the Middle East (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, July 1969), p. 40.

23. Dewan Berindramath, n.3, pp. 31-32. The King-Crane Commission observed "that of itself is evidence of a strong sense of the injustice of the Zionist programme on the part of the non-Jewish populations of Palestine and Syria. Decisions, requiring armies to carry out, are sometimes necessary, but they are surely not gratuitously to be taken in the interests of an injustice. For the initial claim, often submitted by Zionists representatives, that they have a 'right' to Palestine, based on an occupation of two thousand years ago, can hardly be seriously considered", Henry Cattin, n. 19, p. 16.

up of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine, was adjusted including the Balfour Declaration in the mandate over Palestine. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations explained that the mandate system was an instrument for the enforcement of the self-determination principle of people. The agreement between the principal and allied powers at San Remo, in Europe to impose the British mandatory power over Palestine on April 25, 1920 was, in fact, due to the influence and pressure of the prominent Zionist leaders. Thus, the League of Nations also gave a sanction to the British mandate over Palestine on July 24, 1922. Since the Turkish Ottoman empire was integrated with the Arab States, the implementation of British mandate became ineffective. But the Turkish Government had signed the treaty of Sevres of August 10, 1920 which provided that Turkey was ready to isolate the Arab provinces and the Balfour Declaration from herself. This treaty was, however, unratified by the Turkish Assembly. By the treaty of Lausanne, the Arab provinces were separated from Turkish empire on July 24, 1923.^{24.}

PALESTINE UNDER BRITISH MANDATE

The Palestine mandate which was sanctioned to the British Government carried two main goals. First, according to the Preamble the extension of the mandate owes 'the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the

24. Henry Cattar, n. 19, pp. 17-18.

League of Nations - 'The two provisions - the well-being and development' of the people of the mandated territory 'from a sacred trust of civilization' and the survival of Palestine's people 'as an independent nation was provisionally recognized'. Secondly, the enforcement of the Balfour Declaration, incorporated in the Palestine mandate was the task of the mandated power. ²⁵ Article 2 of the Palestine mandate absorbed these objectives which were evidenced by the following paragraph:

"Article 2. The mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

The mandate also provided that the rights and position of other sections of the population should be unaffected by the Jewish immigration. According to Article 6, "The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish Agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including state lands and

25. Ibid., p. 18.

waste lands not required for public purposes." ²⁶

In the beginning, the Zionist efforts to settle the Jews in Palestine did not draw full attention. The Nazi Germany and the policy of persecution of Jews proved conducive for Zionists. The so-called test of 'economic absorptive capacity' was the only mild restriction prescribed to the Jewish immigration by the British Government. A large number of illegal immigrants, underscoring any official limitation caused the creation of artificial devices and the Jewish political and demographic centre which was non-existent for twenty years in Palestine. ²⁷

The following data show more than ten-fold increase in the Jewish population of Palestine within a quarter of a century:

Year	Moslems	Christians	Jews	Others	Total
1918	574,000	70,000	56,000	-	700,000
1922	590,900	73,014	83,794	9,474	757,182
1931	759,712	91,398	174,610	10,101	1,035,821
1946	1,076,780				
	127,000				
	(bedouin)				
	1,203,780	145,060	608,230	15,490	1,972,560

Source: Henry Cattar, Palestine, The Arabs and Israel: The Search for Justice, (London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd. 1969), p. 21

26. Ibid., p. 19.

27. Ibid.

Thus, the aspiration of the Zionists was marked by the increase in number of the Jews from one-twelfth to one third of the population - contrary to the desire of the original inhabitants of Palestine. Undoubtedly, this great modification in the demographic structure of Palestine led to the serious prejudice to the rights and position of the other sections of the population. Increasing Jewish settlement in Palestine caused the demonstrations, protests and even revolt by the original inhabitants of Palestine - moslems and christians alike against the British mandate. The inquiry commission set up in April 20 revealed that the disturbance took place because, Britain had deviated from the promises made to secure independence to the Arabs during the war time, and the Arabs further contended that the Balfour Declaration betrayed their inalienable rights of self-determination. The Arabs feared that they would be subjected both politically and economically by the immigrant Jews. The Peel Royal Commission inquired into the trouble of 1936 and stated that the Arab aspiration for independence and their opposition to the creation of a national home for Jews were the reasons of disorders. According to the Peel Commission recommendations, there should be tripartite partition - the Arab and the Jewish states and in order to include Jerusalem and its surroundings, a permanent British mandate was recommended. The recommendations of the Peel Commission were,

28. Ibid., p. 22.

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however, rejected both by the Arabs and Zionists.

In 1939, the British Government realised that the Arabs rights should be safeguarded according to the terms of the Balfour Declaration and consequently increased violence compelled the British Government to issue the MacDonald white paper in 1939 by which the Jewish immigration was restricted. According to the white paper during the next five years only 75,000 Jews were permitted to migrate to Palestine. In case, a number of immigrants exceeded to a prescribed limit of the MacDonald white paper, then, the Palestine Arabs became necessary to accord immigration.³⁰ The Jews protested against the White paper and it was marked by a series of violence in the Holy Land. There were three Jewish forces in Palestine. The Haganah, the Irgun zvai and the secret group stern Gang, which involved in the extremist activities. In fact, the stern gang was responsible for the murder of the British Minister of state for the Middle East, Lord Moyne, in Cairo in November 1944.³¹

Now the British Mandate was considered to be the main obstacle in creating Jewish majority through immigration. Hence,

29. Alfred M. Lilienthal, What Price Israel? (Chicago: Henry Regenery Company, 1953), p. 39.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., p. 40.

the voice was raised for the termination of the mandate and the white paper of 1939 was condemned by David Ben-Gurion, and prominent Palestinian Zionists. At the same time Weizmann suggested a new policy to pursue for the establishment of a Jewish state. This was, however, not in consonance with the British policy towards Palestine. As there was hostility between the mandatory power and the Zionists, it was to be balanced by winning over the support of the United States in whose leadership the Zionists had confidence and trust.³² In 1942, a major Zionist meeting was convened at the Biltmore Hotel in New York. While denouncing the White Paper the Zionist policy was reframed to establish an absolute sovereign Jewish state in Palestine.³³ The Conference, while stressing on the implementation of the Biele Program of 1897, resolved eight points. Out of the eight resolutions, only last three were approved as a new programme of their policy implementation was as follows:

(1) The Conference cause for the fulfilment of the original purpose of the Balfour Declaration and the mandate which "recognizing the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine" was to afford them an opportunity, as stated by President Wilson, to found there a Jewish Commonwealth. The Conference affirms its unalterable rejection of the White Paper of May 1939 and denies its

32. Richard D. Stevens, American Zionism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1942-1947, (New York: Pageant Press, 1962), p. 2.

33. The Middle East and North Africa - 1975-76 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1975), p. 401.

moral and legal validity. The White Paper seeks to limit, and in fact to nullify Jewish rights to immigration and settlement in Palestine..."

(2) In the struggle against the forces of aggression and tyranny, of which Jews were the earliest victims, and which now menace the Jewish national home, recognition must be given to the right of the Jews in Palestine to play their full part in the war effort and in the defence of their country, through a Jewish military force fighting under its own flag and under the high command of the United Nations.

(3) The Conference declares that the New World Order that will follow victory cannot be established on foundations of peace, justice and equality, unless the problem of Jewish homelessness is finally solved.

The Conference urged that the gates of Palestine be opened; that the Jewish Agency be vested with the control of immigration into Palestine and with the necessary authority for upbuilding the country, including the development of its unoccupied and uncultivated lands; and that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world. This would alone rectify the wrong caused to the Jewish people.³⁴ The work for securing the favour of the American Jewish

34. Richard P. Stevens, n. 32, pp. 3-4.

community behind the Biltmore Program was started by January 1943. It was initiated by a Zionist minded person, Henry Monsky from Eastern Europe, who wanted the unification and strengthening of the Zionism and raised the Zionists voice. Thirty-four national Jewish organisations were invited by Monsky to chose the delegates to a preliminary Conference in Pittsburgh. The meeting was characterised by Monsky as an attempt to integrate the representatives of the American Jewish community as to explore a strategy "with respect to the post-war status of Jews and the up-building of a Jewish Palestine." The meeting took place in Pittsburgh from January 23-24, 1943. It decided to hold an American Jewish Conference to chalk out a common program on Palestine. However, no concrete results were emerged from the meeting and Monsky indicated that the American Jewish committee was still not understanding the political aspirations of Zionism.³⁵ Judge Morris Rothenberg, representative of the Zionist organisation of America, expressed the necessity of the proposed Assembly to secure "a recording of the majority of Jews... as expressed through the democratic forum." He said that in order to rectify the false impression that American Jews were against Zionism, the formation of Assembly was necessary.³⁶

35. Ibid., pp. 5-7.

36. Ibid., p. 7.

THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE

An executive committee was formed to invite the people for the proposed Assembly. The executive committee was also responsible for the fixation of the date for delegates elections, to draw the funds, and to decide the date and place of the meeting. ³⁷ The American Jewish Conference was held on August 29, 1943. As the Palestine issue dominated in the meeting, the Conference declared its determination, for the adoption of the Biltmore Program. Although, the debate indicated the diversity of attitude towards the establishment of a Jewish State or Commonwealth as the aim of the American Jewish Community, the Conference gained a remarkable success for the political pre-dominance among American Jewry. The Conference became, conducive to Zionists efforts to win over the support of American Jewry. ³⁸ The new President of the Zionist organisation of America, Rabbi Israel Goldstein stated that now the aim of the Zionist movement was to "... win the wholehearted approval of the American Government and people for the Zionist program with respect to Palestine, which now has become the program of the whole of American Jewry represented through the democratically elected American Jewish Conference." ³⁹ As the aim of the Zionist was to secure the American support, the Zionist organisation backed by the Interim Committee of the American public and the United States Congress

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., pp. 11 and 13.

39. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

The quest for the American favour and moulding of public opinion prompted the Zionists to do their best. The Zionists realised that Christian sympathy was to be exploited to gain the official support of America. They were trying to secure the support on two pretexts one was that they referred the Biblical promises which was made to the descendants of Abraham as if, the Jews were the only claimants to be his descendants. The other was that the Jews were persecuted at the hands of Nazis during the Second World War. So the Americans became sympathisers of the Jews and they showed their sympathy at the cost of Palestinians who were quite unattached with the catastrophic destination of the Jews in Europe. In 1946, President Harry Truman wanted 100,000 Jews to be admitted in Palestine. But, 4,767 refugees and displaced persons from Europe were allowed to stay in the United States in the same year. The Zionists not only exploited the Biblical promises pretext and Nazi persecution but also did exploit the Jewish vote in the American elections. These factors compelled the Americans to influence the British Government to allow the Jewish immigration to Palestine. This led to the tension between America and the Britain and in

40. Henry Cattin, n. 19, p. 24.

41. Alfred M. Lilienthal, The Other Side of the Coin: An American Perspective of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1965), p. 6.

42. Henry Cattin, no. 19, pp. 23-24.

1946, when Anglo-American committee was created it reported that the conflict between Arabs and Jews would be the hinderance on the way of making of an independent Palestine. Hence, the British Government was advised to continue the mandate until a trusteeship agreement was made under the auspices of the United Nations. The committee also instructed that 100,000 Jews should be allowed in Palestine as per Truman's request.

The British Government felt itself that it was contrary to the wishes of the majority of Palestine's inhabitants to allow the Jewish immigration, the mandatory government was already under pressure from America and it was troubled by the Zionists violence. Thus, in 1947, British Government took the matter of Palestine to the United Nations. The mandate was on the verge of fiasco. The only outcome was that under the mandate there was unprecedented immigration of the Jews, who settled in Palestine and aimed to grab the holyland from its indigenous inhabitants.⁴³

AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The nature of relations between the United States and the Middle East was not political before the world war I. The United States was mainly concerned with the function of academic, missionary, and philanthropic interests. There were many institutions like the American university of Beirut (founded as

43. Ibid., pp. 24-25.

Syrian protestant College in 1866), the American university at Cairo, and Robert College and the American Women's College in Istanbul, as well as the secondary schools known as "colleges" in Tehran and Baghdad, which paid serious attention to the middle east and they tried to bridge the cultural gap between the New World and the Middle East. The American Government's works in these aspects were free from controversies as their works were equally shared and benefitted by both the Arabs and the Jews
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alike.

The post World War I witnessed a sudden change in the nature of America's indulgence in Palestine and the Middle East. Turkey came under the sphere of America's interest as it was being influenced by the opposing forces, which were trying to become a permanent factor in the Palestine question in its American context. Because of the influence exercised by President Woodrow Wilson's Zionist friend and adviser, Louis D. Brandeis, Wilson conveyed his support to the British government for one of the last drafts of the Balfour Declaration. But the State officials opposition to the Balfour Declaration was weak and mild. Therefore, ultimately President Wilson strongly supported the declaration. But with the failure of President Wilson's internationalism and the return of the United States to isolationism, America became disinterested in the political sphere of the Middle East and Palestine. The United States concern with the area was reverted

44. George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (New York: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 529.

once more to being subsidiary to the private interests which not only was of humanitarian, philanthropic and religious but at the same time it had political and economic interests in the Middle East like the French and the British because of oil and other mineral resources needed for her industrialization. As a consequence 23.75% of share was secured by the American government⁴⁵ for the American companies in the Iraq Petroleum concerns. The Anglo-American treaty of 1924 removed the discrimination which was meted out to the American company in the Middle East by the powers which controlled the Middle Eastern companies. It provided the regulation of relationship between the two countries concerning the Palestine mandate and secured the protection of business and⁴⁶ missionary interests of Americans in Palestine.

The aim of American Zionists to pressure the U.S. Government to support the Balfour Declaration and granting of the Palestine mandate of Britain was however, attained. The American Zionists political activity subsided for most of the inter-war period. But the Jews catastrophe under Hitler and the Britain's restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine once again made the American Zionists to launch their stir to pursue their government to get the British policy altered. However, the Zionists were not satisfied by the performance of the president or the State Department. Hence, they exerted their pressure in the Congress.

45. Nadav Safran, The United States and Israel (Cambridge; Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 37.

46. Ibid., p. 38.

where the Jewish lobby could influence and appeal on the inhuman condition of Jews in Europe and elsewhere in the world so that the sympathies of the senators and House of representatives could be won.⁴⁷ For instance, in 1942 Congress endorsed the Balfour Declaration by adopting a Joint resolution. The resolution was as follows:

"Resolved by the senate and House of representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled.

That the United States of America favours the establishment in Palestine of a national Home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the Holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected."⁴⁸

With the intense private interests of American citizens during the second world war, the development of American Government new interests was added in the area. Towards the end of the second world war, the American Government showed interest in the Middle East oil.⁴⁹

47. Ibid.

48. Ralph H. Magnus, (ed), n. 22, p. 40.

49. Nadav Sfran, n. 45, p. 39.

Initially at the outbreak of war the Zionist could not draw much attention to the problem of Jews and Palestine. But when they foresaw the victory and got the information of Nazis exterminating of the Jews, the American Zionists pressurised the American Government to persuade the British to relax the immigration policy for the Jews and to support their cause for a Jewish state in Palestine. It was responded by the Congress with a series of resolutions and declarations during the period 1943-1945, supporting the unrestricted immigration and a Jewish state. During the presidential campaign Frank Roosevelt, on the one hand, openly supported the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine and on the other hand, he gave ambiguous pledges to King Ibn-Saud of Saudi Arabia that no action would be taken which might be prejudiced to the Arabs without the consultation with both the Arabs and the Jews. The war department expressed pessimism over the Congress and presidential support to Jewish state as it would endanger the war efforts of allies. The state Department, however, pointed out that Palestine was Britain's responsibility except, in so far as the American Government wanted to solve the general problem of the European Jewry and wanted to help them out of this trouble. After the war President Truman appealed to Prime Minister Attlee to admit 100,000 survivors of the Nazi camps to Palestine.

50. Ibid., pp. 39-40.

American Government realised during the war that the region was strategically important and economically viable to promote her own interests. At the same time it would be able to contain the Russian influence. But when war was on the verge of extinction, it seemed as if the Americans were leaving the area and entrusting its responsibility to the British. But the American Government's observation of Civil war in Greece and Soviet pressure on Turkey and Iran stimulated the American engagements in the region. Initially, America strengthened her position politically, militarily and economically as a chief actor in the region. The United States Truman Doctrine was the result of the Britains relegation of responsibility for Greece and Turkey in the Spring of 1947.⁵¹ The Truman Doctrine provided that the United States would guarantee the security of Greece and Turkey and Iran and thus, contain the communism in the region. While expounding the Truman Doctrine, President Harry Truman declared on March 12, 1947:

"one of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for its members. We shall not realise our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free

51. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

peoples to maintain their free institutions and national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose on them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples by direct or indirect aggression undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States."

Thus it paved the way for American presence in the Middle East.

UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS

An extraordinary session of the United Nations was held in April and May 1947 and on May 15, 1947 it appointed the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to study the problem of Palestine. Two plans for the partition of Palestine were approved by the UNSCOP when it submitted its final report in September 1947, which was characterised as the majority plan and minority plan. The majority plan provided that the mandate should be terminated, Palestine should be partitioned and an Arab-state and a Jewish state should be established, and the city

52. A.G. Naidu, U.S. Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New Delhi: Tulsi Publishing House, 1981), p. 4. For detailed text see Harry S. Truman, "Message of the President to the Congress", Department of State Bulletin (Washington D.C.), Vol. 16, 23 March 1947, pp. 534-537.

of Jerusalem and the area around it should be kept under the banner of special international regime to be managed by the United Nations. It also provided for the economic co-operation between the Arab and the Jewish states. Like majority plan, the minority plan also provided for the termination of mandate but unlike majority plan, it said that a federal state should be created which would consist of an Arab and a Jewish state with Jerusalem as the capital.⁵³

The partition plan was opposed by the Arabs condemning it as unlawful, unjust and undemocratic and contrary to wishes of the majority of the inhabitants. They also wanted an explanation of the legitimacy of the United Nations recommendation of partition of their ancestral homeland. Their efforts to take the matter to the international court of Justice were hampered several times by the political forces which wanted to avoid any adverse judicial ruling and consequently this was described as the avoidance of international law.⁵⁴

53. Henry Cattan, n. 19, p. 25. UNSCOP was composed of eleven states; they were Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. The majority report was endorsed by the Netherlands, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Peru, Guatemala and Uruguay. The minority report was endorsed by India, Iran and Yugoslavia. Bharat Bhushan Gupta, Arab-Israel Relations (New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House, 1978), p. 15.

54. Ibid., p. 25.

Herschel V. Johnson, United States Deputy Representative to the United Nations on October 11, 1947 emphasized in his statement that:

"The United States delegation supports the basic principles of the unanimous recommendations and the majority plan which provide for partition and immigration. It is of the opinion, however, that certain amendments and modifications would have to be made in the majority plan in order to more accurately to give effect to the principles on which that plan is based. My delegation believes that certain geographical modifications must be made. For example Jaffa should be included in the Arab State because it is predominantly an Arab city.

My delegation suggests that the General Assembly may wish to provide that all the inhabitants of Palestine, regardless of citizenship or place of residence, be guaranteed access to ports and to water and power facilities on a non-discriminatory basis, that constitutional guarantees, including guarantees regarding equal economic opportunity, be provided for Arabs and Jews alike, and that the powers of the Joint Economic Board be strengthened. Any solution which this committee recommends should not only be just, but, also workable and of a nature to command the approval of World opinion."

55. A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49 (Washington: Prepared by the Staff of the Committee and the Department of State, 1950), p. 819.

But the Arabs opposed the General Assembly's plan from adopting a resolution following the provision of the majority report with some modifications. On November 29, 1947 this resolution was however, favoured by 33 votes, opposed by 13 votes and 10 members remained absent.⁵⁶ According to the partition plan, Palestine was divided into six principal parts. Out of six three were given to the Jewish state and three with the 'enclave of Jaffa' to the Arab state. A remarkable point was that though this prejudiced division allotted the Jewish state all areas, which the Jews owned and inhabited yet a large area was to be included in that which was inhabited and owned by the Arabs. On the other hand, the Arab states were to have a small number of Jews and the least amount of Jewish property. Jerusalem city and the adjoining area including Bethlehem was declared the international zone under the supervision of United Nations.⁵⁷

It should be pointed out that at the time of adoption of resolution in the United Nations in 1947, the Jewish population increased chiefly through immigration by 650,000 million while 1,350,000 Arabs had risen by natural growth and this had increased the Arab population to 67.5% and the Jewish population to 32.5%. The Jewish land ownership had only risen to 6% of the

56. Dewan Berindranath, n. 3, p. 35.

57. Ibid.

total area. But surprisingly, the division provided by the partition resolution was as follows:

- (I) 56% of the total area was allotted to the Jewish state which has ten times more than the Jews possessed in land property.
- (II) Although the Arabs constituted 67.5% of the population 94% of the total area, they were given only 42% of the whole country.
- (III) 37% of the total Arab population i.e. 497,000 Arabs were kept under the domination of the Jewish state.
- (IV) Jerusalem was established an international zone with 6.5% of the area assigned.
58

In fact, the Zionist lobby played the most important part to secure the vote in favour of partition. Initially, it was presumed that the partition would not get the requisite two-thirds majority of voting. But the postponement of the voting on several occasions with some pretext or the other changed the voting trend in favour of the Jews. The postponement of voting ultimately provided an opportunity to the Zionist lobby and the state officials to influence some countries like China, Ethiopia, Liberia, Greece and the Phillipines - in favour of partition. These all the states had planned to vote against the partition but ultimately they

58. Ibid., p. 36.

were influenced by the United States and Greece was the only country⁵⁹ which could not be pressurised.

In his memoirs (Published in 1947), Chaim Weizmann had written that President Truman himself had staunchly intervened and had declared in his memoirs that:

"I have no Arab constituents" No doubt, he gave weightage to⁶⁰ Jewish vote than to the rights of the Arab majority. Pitman B. Potter had observed: "The United States came close to exercising under influence to get the partition plan adopted." Dr Stephen B.L. Penrose, president of the American University of Beirut was also critical of American policy towards Arabs and pointed out: "The political manoeuvring which led to the final acceptance of the United Nations General Assembly of the majority report of UNSCOP provides one of the blacker pages in the history of American international politics. There can be no question but that it was American pressure for partition of Palestine with Economic Union voted by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947. It was this American pressure for partition which is largely responsible for the terrific drop which American prestige took in all parts of the⁶¹ Arab and muslim world." The partition was favoured by some of the

59. Henry Cattani, n. 19, p. 26.

60. Dewan Berindranath, n. 3., p. 35.

61. Henry Cattani, n. 19, p. 27.

leading countries because of the inhuman torture meted out to the Jews all over the world and the sufferings of the refugees of the Nazi holocaust further owned the sympathies of the Christian nations. It was eventually decided that these Jewish refugees should have a national home in Palestine. This was however, an excuse for American leaders for the Jewish vote which was a strong weapon in the hands of Zionist lobby.⁶²

AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR PROCLAMATION OF ISRAEL

The partition resolution aggravated the crisis in Palestine. It was in the garb of demonstrations, protests and tension; the Arabs had taken their stand against the partition of their country while the Jews were adamant to establish a Jewish state. The situation in Palestine was increasingly deteriorating and security council became a mere spectator.⁶³ As the future of partition plan was foreseen as lurking in the darkness because of its unworkability the officials of the State and Defense Departments, though disinterested in the partition, which was largely a White House policy, foresaw the threat that if America was to stick to the partition plan, then it would affect the American strategic and economic interests in the Middle East. America decided to relegate this plan as its policy or at least abandon it as the earliest solution to the problem of Palestine. On March 19, 1948,

62. Alfred M. Lilienthal, There Goes the Middle East (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1957), p. 7.

63. Henry Cattin, n. 19, p. 31.

Harrell R. Austin, the U.S. representative to the United Nations asked the security council to establish a temporary U.N. Trusteeship over Palestine as the partition could not find its implementation. The idea behind this statement was to make the Arabs believe that United States had conceded the partition plan as a blunder.⁶⁴ This American reversal policy was protested and condemned by the American Zionists and other Jewish politicians and the other important citizens. But while the United Nations was discussing the matter of trusteeship, the Palestine Jews received a shipment of Russian arms and on May 14, 1948, after the British forces were withdrawn from Palestine, then the Jews launched an offensive attack and occupied most of the areas, which was given to them under the plan and then on May 14, 1948 itself they proclaimed the Jewish state which they named as Israel.⁶⁵ On May 14, 1948, a letter was sent to the President Truman of the United States of America by the Agent of the provisional Government of Israel in which it was stated that:

"MY DEAR PRESIDENT, I have the honor to notify you that the state of Israel has been proclaimed as an independent republic within frontiers approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution of November 29, 1947, and that a provisional government has been charged to assume the rights and duties of government for preserving law and order within the boundaries of Israel, for defending the state against external aggression, and

64. The United States in World Affairs, 1948-1949, (New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations), pp. 381-382.

65. Nadav Safran, n. 16, p. 38.

for discharging the obligations of Israel to the other nations of the world in accordance with international law. The act of independence will become effective at one minute after six o'clock on the evening of 14 May 1948, Washington time.

With full knowledge of deep bond of sympathy which has existed and has been strengthened over the past thirty years between the Government of the United States and the Jewish people of Palestine. I have been authorized by the provisional government of the new state to tender this message and to express the hope that your government will recognize and will welcome Israel into the community."

Very respectfully yours,

ELIAHU ELSIEZ

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Agent, Provisional Government of Israel.

It was President Truman, who was the first to give recognition to Israel followed by the USSR.⁶⁷ The admittance of President Truman that "partition was not taking place in exactly the peaceful manner that I had hoped", became ambiguous when he "decided to move at once and give American recognition to the new nation". His memoirs indicated the fear "that some of the State

66. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XVIII, May 23, 1948, p. 673

67. A.P.S. Bindra, Suez Thrombosis: Causes and Prospects (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1962), p. 17.

Department 'experts' would want to block recognition of a Jewish state ...". To avoid any such obstacle, eleven minutes after Israel had been proclaimed a state, Charlie Ross, the President's press secretary apprised correspondents of the ⁶⁸defacto recognition. On May 14, 1948, the White House brought out President Truman's statement to the press that: "This Government has been informed that a Jewish state has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been requested by the provincial government thereof. The United States recognizes the provincial government as the ⁶⁹defacto authority of the new state of Israel."

The Haganah group was made official army of the new state. Soon hostilities escalated between Israel and its four neighbouring Arab States, namely, Trans Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. The Arab armies fought with the Israelis without any concrete results because the Israelis proved stronger and tougher resistance to the Arabs forces. It was Count Folke Bernadotte, the appointed UN mediator who was successful in arranging a month's truce which ⁷⁰lasted from June 11 to July 7, 1948. This truce was arranged according to the resolution of May 29, 1948. The Israelis ignored their agreement of refraining from the import of war materials during the truce, and the respite gave them time to strengthen their

68. Alfred M. Lilienthal, n. 62, p. 14.

69. Department of State Bulletin, n. 66, p. 673.

70. Henry Cattan, n. 19, p. 34.

military power. As soon as the truce expired the hostilities restarted. With the occupation of these areas allotted to the Jewish State by the partition plan, they also seized the whole of Western Galilee as well as Lydda, Ramleh and a large part of Central Palestine, evacuated by the Arab legion of Trans Jordan. These areas were given to the Arab State by partition plan. This conflict took place for ten days on July 15, 1948, the disputing parties were asked by the security council to end the military hostilities. The second truce was enforced on July 18, 1948 for indefinite period. Count Folke Bernadotte was conferred on the authority to supervise the observance and to settle the future of Palestine peacefully.⁷¹

On September 16, Count Bernadotte gave his report to the United Nations which recommended that the establishment of a Palestinian Arab State including the Negev, the demilitarization of Jerusalem and the repatriation of the Palestinian Arab refugees. The next day on September 17, 1948, he was shot dead by the Jewish terrorists at a road block made in a Jewish occupied area of Jerusalem.⁷² On October 15, 1948 truce was violated again in which Israelis occupied Beersheba, Bait Hanun (which is five miles north east of Gaza) and Bait NJibrin (in the direction of the Hebron). A cease-fire has agreed upon by the parties which was supposed to have

71. Ibid., p. 35.

72. Stephen Green, Taking Sides: America's Secret Relation with a Militant Israel, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc. 1984), p. 38.

been enforced from October 22, 1948. But the warning of the UN chief of staff was ignored by the Israelis and they attacked on the Lebanese territory.⁷³ In November, the Israelis proceeded to the Negev in the Gulf of Aqaba direction. Again on December 22, 1948, they attacked in the south, and the area of Ajja was seized and there was a substantial penetration in Sinai. Although, an armistice agreement had taken place in February 24, 1949 with Egypt. Yet the Israelis occupied the Palestine police post of Umm Kashrash, renamed by the Israelis as Eilat which was at the head of Gulf of Aqaba. The Palestine war ended with the conclusion of four Armistice Agreements which was signed by Israel with Egypt on February 24, 1949, with Lebanon on March 23, 1949, with Jordan on April 3, 1949 and with Syria on July 20, 1949. The Palestine war was described by commander Hutchison as "it was a short war marked by outside intervention, Arab disunity and unlimited aid to Israel from the west, in addition to timely and substantial shipment of arms from behind the Iron Curtain, primarily from Czechoslovakia. This aid, sent in against the orders of the United Nations, was significant to turn the tide of battle and to grant Israel considerable land gains."⁷⁴

In the war of 1948 and 1949, the seizure of the total areas by the Israelis 20,850 square kilometres - out of 26,323 square kilometres representing the entire area of Palestine. Meaning

73. G. Kirk, The Middle East 1941-1950 (London: Oxford University press, 1954), pp. 287-288.

74. Henry Cattin, p. 19, p. 36.

thereby, increasing of the territory of the Jewish State as allotted by the United Nations was from 14,500 square kilometres to 20,850 square kilometres and thus, Israelis diminished the territory of the Arab State from 11,800 square kilometres to 5,400 square kilometres. The total areas fell under Israeli control was almost 80 percent of the territory of the country and the amount of area Israel occupied in 1949 was 80 percent in contrast to the total Jewish land ownership, which was only 6 percent in the whole of Palestine.

Now, the Arabs were left only with one-fifth of the original territory of their country. Remarkably, the mountainous desert contained 3,000 square kilometres out of the 8,000 square kilometres. The infertility prevailed in the remaining 5,000 square kilometres⁷⁵ except some land around Nablus and Jericho.

The American chairman of the Israeli-Jordan Armistic commission had concluded that the consequence of the Palestine conflict of 1948 as follows:

'The brief official Palestine war of 1948-1949 is now a part of history - it settled none of the basic issues of Arab-Israeli contention. The major powers of the west and the East, losing sight of the true value of a friendly Arab world in the swirling clouds of a Zionist propaganda, overran the rights of the indigenous population of Palestine - the Arabs. Every step in the establishment of a

75. Ibid., p. 37.

Zionist State had been a challenge to Justice."⁷⁶

The war of 1948 kept the basic issues unsettled and at the same time created the Palestine refugees problem.⁷⁷ Uptil now, the U.S. involvement in the region was characterised by strategic and economic interests. But the creation of Israel made U.S.A. the guardian of the new Jewish State.⁷⁸

76. Ibid., p. 38; Also see in E.H. Hutchison's Violent Truce (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1956), p. 95.

77. Ibid.

78. A.C. Naidu, n. 52, p. 6 .

CHAPTER-IIIMPACT OF SUEZ IMEROGLIO ON AMERICAN-ISRAELI POLICIES

Nationalization of the Suez canal in 1956 escalated the Egypt's tensed relations with the three powers - England, France and Israel and severely antagonised Britain, particularly Prime Minister Anthony Eden, although compensation was promised to the share-holders of the company. The efficient working of the new canal authority and undisturbed oil flow of Europe through the Suez canal² perturbed Britain. Egyptian President, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser's action had already weakened the British empire in the middle east, as it had lost the grip in Jordan and other Arab principalities and also in Africa. Britain felt insulted and determined to over throw Nasser's regime and the Suez crisis³ provided an opportunity to invade Egypt.

France, which was also the sharer of the old canal company⁴ equally disturbed by the nationalization. But the hidden hatred for

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1. A.J.P. Taylor and Jim Roberts (eds.), 20th Century (Toronto; London: Purnell Reference Books, 1979), p. 2259.
 2. Stephen Green, Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations with a Militant Israel (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1984), p. 123.
 3. Nadav Safran, The United States and Israel (Cambridge; Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 240.
 4. Stephen Green, n. 2, p. 123.

Egyptians was already there, for Nasser had supported the Algerian revolution in November 1954.⁵ Cessation of Israeli right of passage through the strait of Tiran led to friction between Israel and Egypt and in 1955 President Nasser felt humiliated because of a series of raids on the Gaza strips and the subsequent penetration in the Egyptian territory by the Israeli forces. Egypt was compelled to seek the military assistance from the Soviet Union to counter the Israeli forces. Consequently, Israel's military superiority was threatened. This, in fact, further intensified bitterness between Egypt and Israel and the peace in the Middle East was, thus, threatened.⁶

ASWAN DAM OFFER AND THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL

The American Government was gravely concerned with Soviet entrance in the Middle East and Egypt's growing contacts with the Soviet Union. In order to combat further Soviet involvement in the region, the United States offered an aid to finance the construction of Aswan High Dam in Egypt.⁷ The construction of the Aswan Dam in the Nile, which was expected to cost to \$ 1.3 billion aimed to provide irrigation facilities and hydro-electric energy for industrialization in Egypt.⁸ The world Bank and the United States

5. A.J.P. Taylor & Jim Roberts, n. 1, p. 224.

6. Stephen Green, n. 2, p. 124.

7. A.G. Naidu, U.S. Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New Delhi: Tulsi Publishing House, 1981), p. 16.

8. Tarun Chandra Bose, The Superpowers and the Middle East (Bombay Asia Publishing House, 1972), p. 24.

were the primary sources of aid to finance the dam. Negotiations took place between Nasser and the World Bank President, Eugene Black in which Egypt accepted the Supervision of the World Bank in Egypt's foreign debt schedules. Finally Egypt was granted the Bank loan for about half of the foreign currency that was needed for the construction of the dam. The Bank fixed the interest at the rate of 5.5 percent. The United States also imposed certain conditions that Egypt would not seek the supply of Soviet arms.⁹ Both Britain and the United States wanted Egypt to conclude a peace treaty with Israel apart from monetary obligations. The conditions made by the World Bank and the United States were in a way to make Egypt abandon its national sovereignty and her economic and foreign policy to be further controlled by the Western powers.¹⁰

9. Stephen Green, n. 2, p. 131. "In early 1950s as a result of frequent Israeli raids into the Egyptian territory, Egypt sought military assistance from the U.S.A. which initially agreed to assist. However, Washington was not very much interested in the arms deal with Cairo. This led Nasser to turn toward the Soviet Union. When he reached an initial agreement with the Soviet Union for arms supply, Nasser informed Kermit Roosevelt, an old friend of the Egyptian leader and a veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations in the Middle East. Consequently, under the instructions of the State Department, Roosevelt went to Cairo to abstain Nasser from concluding any arms agreement with the Soviet Union, but it went in vein and Nasser announced in September, 1955, the arms deal agreement with the Soviet Union. A.G. Naidu, n. 7, p. 9 .

10. Stephen Green, n. 2, p. 131 .

The pro-Israel lobby in the Congress, however, opposed the American aid to Aswan Dam. In July 1956, Anthony Nutting, British Minister of State of the foreign office, was told by Cabot Lodge, the American ambassador to the United Nations that:

"Dulles in all probability shortly renege on the Aswan Dam loan. This was due largely to internal political problems. The administration's foreign aid program had recently run into serious trouble in congress, where drastic cuts had been made. In this climate it would be counting a further rebuff to ask for an appropriation for the Aswan loan. Although the government had tried hard to get back on terms with Arab world the damage done by President Truman's pro-Israeli policies, there were powerful anti-Arab, and more particularly anti-Egyptian, voices in Congress. Zionist influences were very strong and were continually at work belaboring the government for letting Nasser get away with his blockade of the Suez canal against Israeli shipping. And only a month before Egypt had upset the apple-cart still farther by recognizing communist China. Now the Zionist lobby in opposing aid to Egypt, and with the presidential election coming alone in less than four months, it just was not practical politics for the administration to go ahead and ask congress to approve so large a loan to Egypt."

The U.S. Government, however, pretended that "it was not feasible in present circumstances "to engage in the Aswan project. It was also

11. Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson. The Story of Suez (London: C. Tinsling and Co. Ltd., 1967), p. 44.

said that the project was not accepted by the Nile riparian states and Egypt was unable to spend the sufficient financial resources in the project as it had already spent its financial resources in the arms deal with the Soviet Union. In July 1956 America¹² announced the withdrawal of the Aswan aid. No doubt, Nasser presumed this situation as he was aware of the recent developments in the congress and the United States as a whole in regard to the opposition of the aid. But Nasser had made up his mind to proceed the construction of the dam and he had two alternatives - either to agree with the Soviets conditions to secure aid or to incur money from the Egyptian funds. At that time Egypt had two major sources of foreign currency earnings - one was the cotton exports and the other was the small stipend by the largely British and French owned Suez canal company. Since the Egyptian Government failed to mobilize its internal resources to finance the project because of its dwindled cotton exports, the Egyptian Government¹³ nationalized the Suez canal to finance funds for the Aswan project.

Thus, on July 26, 1956, standing on a podium in Liberation square in Alexandria, President Nasser proclaimed before the Egyptian people that: "the universal Suez maritime canal company S.A.E. is hereby nationalized. All funds and rights and obligations connected therewith are transferred to the State. All bodies and committees at present existing for its administration are

12. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 31, 30 July 1956, p. 188.

13. Stephen Green, n. 2, p. 132.

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 dissolved..." Nasser also said that compensation would be paid to the share and bondholders of the canal-company. This would be noted that from the day of the nationalization of the canal until the time of invasion no incident took place in the canal area. Even President Nasser stuck to the terms of 1888 treaty which guaranteed the rights of free passage through the canal. At the same time two ships under charter to Israel were also permitted to
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 pass without any hinderance. Egypt's nationalisation of the Suez canal shocked both Britain and France. The members of the congress and the diplomatic observers in Washington viewed it as the explosive situation, though they did not declare it illegal. The Suez crisis became the main issue during the 1956 presidential election and the Democratic and Republican parties were fully aware of the "Jewish-vote" and thus, the U.S. Administration
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 favoured Israel's friendship.

DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE CRISIS

When on August 1, 1956, Dulles reached London to join the meeting between Britain, France and the United States, he was agreed on Anthony Eden's point stated in the House of Commons that the present Suez canal management was unacceptable "which would leave it in the unfettered control of a single power which could ... exploit it purely for purposes of National policy" and in order to

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., p. 133

16. Alfred M. Lilienthal, There Goes the Middle East (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1957), pp. 181-182.

make Eden pleased he said that they find a way to make President Nasser "disgorge." Even he advocated of using force as a last resort. This led to the making of a tripartite statement that was Anglo-French, United States statement on August 2, 1956. It showed that the three foreign ministers were in full agreement that Egypt's action was "far more than a simple act of nationalisation." They observed it an "arbitrary and unilateral seizure by one nation of an international agency which has the responsibility to maintain and to operate the Suez canal so that all the signatories to, and beneficiaries of, the treaty of 1888 can effectively enjoy the use of an international water way on which the economy, commerce and security of much of the world depends." ¹⁷ A conference was proposed

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17. Liela S. Kadi, A Survey of American-Israeli Relations (Beirut: Palestine Research Center, Lebanon, 1969), p. 81. The signatories to the treaty of 1888, were - France, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Spain, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia and Turkey. The treaty which was concluded in Constantinople gave the international status to the Suez Canal. Article 1 of the Convention declared Suez Canal free and open for the merchant and war vessels during both the situation of war and peace. The parties to the treaty declared that they would not defy this provision and would never impose blockade in the Canal. The further articles strictly prohibited the hostilities in the Canal, which also covered the Canal's entrance ports and the waters within three maritime miles around the latter. However, belligerents were allowed to use the Canal for passage but various restrictions were to be imposed to avoid hostilities in the Canal waters. According to Article 10 of the Convention, Turkey and Egypt were conferred on the right to take measures if they consider it unavoidable for their defense. However, Article 11 said that these measures should not impede the free use of the Canal. The Canal should also not be fortified. Article 14 of the Convention gave permanency to the principle of free navigation. Thus, the Constantinople Convention of 1888 declared the principle of free navigation in the Canal for all nations. George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (New York; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), pp. 490-491.

to be attended by the signatories of constantinople covention of 1888 and such other nations who more or less were concerned with the use of the canal. This conference was to be held in London on August 16, 1956 for the purpose of creating a managing body for the canal "under an international system." On August 3, 1956, John Foster Dulles stated in a broadcast that: "there were some people who counseled immediate forcible action by the governments which felt themselves most directly affected. This, however, would have been contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter and would undoubtedly have led to widespread violence endangering¹⁸ the peace of the world." However, Eden was in a mood to resort to force. It was a fact that full compensation was promised to the share and bondholders of the Suez canal company and there was not a single attempt to restrict the passage of vessels through the canal. But the British Prime Minister's view was that 'a man with colonel Nasser's record could not be allowed to have his thumb on our windpipe'. Moreover, he communicated President Dwight D. Eisenhower of the United States, through a letter that: "my colleagues and I are convinced that we must be ready, in the last resort, to use force to bring Nasser to his senses. For our part we¹⁹ are prepared to do so."

18. Ibid., p. 82.

19. A.J.P. Taylor and Jim Resorts, n. 1, p. 2260.

Eden was quite aware of the French determination to use force. But the United States was not ready to resort to force, although Dulles, in a meeting on August 1, 1956, had already stated that they should use force as a last resort. In fact, Britain and France did not seek any direct help from the United States but Eden said to one of Dulles' Assistants that: "we do hope you will take care of the Bear." In other words, he wanted to say that U.S.A. would prevent the Soviet Union to come to Egypt's rescue.. Eden assumed that he had persuaded America on this point. But he was in aberration as there were three reasons for the United States' denial to use force to settle the Suez dispute. Firstly, the Suez crisis took place at the time of presidential election in the United States. In such a situation the United States thought it better to settle the issue peacefully. Secondly, the United States' interests were not as much at stake as of Britain and France. The U.S. imported less than four percent of its crude oil requirements from the Middle East when comparing to quarters of oil for Western Europe's needs was provided by the Middle East. Lastly, the United States was suspicious of European 'colonialism' which was an age-old phenomena. This reason was reflected in the statement of Sherman Adams, one of President Eisenhower's closest advisers who said that: "our firm opposition to colonialism made us

20. Ibid., p. 2260.

21. Tarun Chandra Bose, p. 8, p. 35.

sympathetic to the struggle which Egypt and other Arab States were making to free themselves of the political and economic control that the British felt they had to maintain in the Middle East in their own self-interest."²²

The Conference which was started in Lancaster House in London on August 16, 1956, was not attended by Nasser.²³ There were two plans which occurred from the Conference. One was the majority plan - consisted of the United States, Britain, France and some other 15 Western Oriented canal users. It stated that the canal should be returned to the signatories of the Constantinople convention of 1888. But the minority plan which was approved by India, the Soviet Union, Indonesia and Ceylon wanted Egypt to remain the controller of the canal to have an advisory body which could look after the "user interests." However, the majority report was delivered to Nasser by R.G. Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, who was given this responsibility. As expected, President Nasser rejected the proposal. It was Dulles, who coined the idea of a Suez canal Users' Association (SCUA).²⁴ Although the purpose of the SCUA was not framed, yet Dulles' indication was that the SCUA would stand ready to arrange navigation and supervise the management of the canal as a whole. Because of the expectation of Nasser's disagreement to such an idea, no definite purposes of the SCUA was

22. A.J.P. Taylor and Jim Roberts, n. 1, p. 2260.

23. Leila S. Kadi, n. 17, p. 82.

24. Stephen Green, n. 2, p. 135.

agreed. On September 23, 1956, Britain and France took this matter ²⁵ to the Security Council of the United Nations. "Six principles" which were formulated by the Security Council on October 13, 1956, agreed by Egypt as the basis for negotiation were as follows:

- (1) passage and shipping through the canal should be free and open subject to no political or technical discrimination;
- (2) Egypt's sovereignty should be respected;
- (3) The operation of the canal should be "insulated" from the politics of all countries;
- (4) Egypt and the users were to fix tolls and charges by agreement;
- (5) A fair proportion of the dues was to be set aside for canal development;
- (6) Disputes between the old Suez canal company and Egypt should ²⁶ be settled by negotiation or arbitration.

Since the effective control was accorded to Egypt by the above six principles, Britain and France expressed their exasperation and decided to resort to force for denationalization of the Suez canal. The invasion, however, was already planned. French Defense Ministry contacted the Israeli Military Attache in the last week of July in Paris and wanted to know whether Israel would indulge herself in the Joint British-French

25. Leila S. Kadi, n. 17, p. 84.

26. Bharat Bhushan Gupta, Arab-Israeli Relations (New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House, 1976), pp. 40-41. For detailed study see Asian Recorder, Vol. I, no. 95, pp. 1088-1089.

27

"Military action." By Mid-August the operation Musketeer plan was fully made by the British and French Defense Ministries which aimed at the Seizure and holding of the Suez canal zone. The Israeli Defense Forces was contacted by the French Defense Ministry again on September 1, 1956, to know the wish of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to participate in "Operation Musketeer". A detailed discussion took place between the French General Staff who hosted the meeting and the delegation of the IDF, led by Moshe Dayan, the IDF Chief of Staff, from September 29 to October 1 in Sevres, near Paris to decide the mode of "operation Musketeer". When Moshe Dayan returned from Sevres on October 1, he called a meeting of the General Staff of IDF and informed that Israel would join Britain and France in military operation against the Arabs. On October 8, 1956, Moshe Dayan convened a meeting of the IDF staff to get the approval of the "operation Kadesh" which was codenamed after the site of the "last Sojourn in the Sinai wilderness by the Children of Israel before continuing to the promised land." ²⁸ It was, in fact, a long term intention of Israel to seize the Sinai peninsula. There were certain reasons for such intention. They were religious, historical dreams, ²⁹ political necessity, strategic designs, and self defense. Israel's Prime Minister, Ben-Gurion's intensified thinking for the Sinai

27. Stephen Green, n. 2, p. 135.

28. Ibid., p. 136.

29. E.B. Childers, The Road to Suez (London: MacGibbon L. Kee, 1962) p. 175.

seizure was further stimulated by two new factors - one was the agreement between Britain and Egypt for the British evacuation of the Suez Canal zone and the second was that President Nasser had emerged as a very important, dynamic, widely popular neutralist Arab leader in January 1955. Further, Israel considered itself secured by the presence of British troops at the canal. In case of Egyptian attack, the Egyptian forces, thus, were to face first the British troops as the "buffer" before confronting Israel. As in 1954 Britain agreed to evacuate the area and this policy, however, paved the way for considerable change in the strategic positions of Israel. At the same time Ben-Gurion and his advisers were contemplating to occupy Sinai, which had now stood between Egypt and Israel.³⁰ Prime Minister Eden appealed to President Eisenhower to

30. In 1955, Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, who had intimate association with the rise of Israel ever since 1917, explained the implications in the event of British evacuation of the Canal zone, and of Egypt's denial to the passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal. The memorandum for Israel which was written by R. Meinertzhagen, in his diary on November 2, 1956, highlighted the following main points of the situation:

- (i) Make Egypt the aggressor
- (ii) (Attack towards and) reach to the Canal in fifty-six hours, and, at once,
- (iii) Proclaim it to be an international waterway under International control, with a neutral zone on either side so as to isolate Egypt from Israel for all time. "Proclaim Israeli sovereignty over Sinai." This memorandum was presumably given by Colonel Meinertzhagen to the Israeli Ambassador in London when he often met. Leila S. Kadí, n. 17, p. 89.

be firm with President Nasser as Egypt was inclined toward Russia and had counted Russian support during nationalization of the Suez and Russia also had denounced both Britain and France. John Foster Dulles understood that Britain and France were adamant to fight a war with Egypt and CIA also informed the State Department that Israel had signed an agreement for French arms.³¹ The military Intelligence apprised the United States government during the last week of October that Israeli troops were mobilizing.³² The same day, on October 25, 1956, when the Israeli forces moved, Israel's Ambassador to the United States, Abba Eban, while addressing to the security council proclaimed that "the government of Israel will faithfully observe the cease-fire so long as the cease-fire is observed by the other side. It will start no war. It will initiate no violence."³³ It was on Sunday, October 28, 1956 that Abba Eban was summoned by John Foster Dulles in his office so that he could prevent Israelis attack on Egypt. But Abba Eban

31. Ibid., p. 92. "The repeated demand of Israel for the arms from the United States to counter Soviet's supply of arms to Egypt was not fulfilled by the United States. Israel, then, turned to France, which had sympathy for Israelis and a desire to maintain French presence some where in the eastern Mediterranean. An agreement took place between France and Israel for the arms deal which was disclosed in the Summer, although the rate and manner of delivery were successfully kept secret." Winston Burdett, Encounter with the Middle East. An Intimate Report on what Lies Behind the Arab-Israeli Conflict (London: Andre Deutsch, 1970), pp. 95 and 97.

32. E.B. Childers, n. 29, p. 246.

33. New York Times, October 26, 1956.

informed that Israeli Intelligence had gathered the information about Egyptian intention to attack Israel. Dulles, however, did not reveal Eban the Aerial Reconnaissance being carried out by the American forces who had the exact information of the Middle East warfare.³⁴ Dulles told Abba Eban that: "If he thought that (American) Jewish sympathy would have any part, lots of influence on the election, or that would have any influence on me (Eisenhower) as to what this Administration would do to prevent any outbreak of hostilities, he should disabuse his mind about it."³⁵

THE TRIPARTITE INVASION AND THE END OF THE CRISIS

Despite its repeated instructions and warnings to the Israelis,³⁶ America could not prevent Israel from resorting to force. Although, at the first moment there was no information to Pentagon of the secret talks between Britain, France and Israel for a Joint attack, yet it had informed the occurrence of a war consequence in the Middle East. It was on August 17, 1956, after President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, the office of the secretary of defense urged the Pentagon's Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) to analyse "the feasibility of a preventive war aimed at stalling the rate of Arab cohesion" in order to "support the policy decision of the secretary of Defense." The Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) that "in the short term" there might be "a brief war" started by Israel

34. Stephen Green, n. 2, p. 137.

35. E.B. Childers, n. 29, p. 246.

36. Leila S. Kadi, n. 17, p. 94.

against Egypt to overthrow Nasser's Government, to cripple his Army, and to "gain territorial objectives". The report also indicated that Israel might start mobilizing before November 1956, when Egypt would absorb the Russian weapons to pose a threat to

³⁷ Israel. It was on October 29, 1956, that Israeli troops invaded Sinai and proceeded rapidly both to the straits of Tiran and the ³⁸ Suez Canal. Meanwhile on October 30, a Joint Anglo-French ultimatum was given to both Israel and Egypt. This ultimatum urged the two sides to stop military action and withdraw their forces to a distance of ten miles from the Canal. It was also said that "in order to guarantee freedom of transit through the canal by the ships of the nations and in order to separate the belligerents", the Egyptian Government should accept the temporarily movement of Anglo-French forces in "key positions at port said, Ismailia and ³⁹ Suez." The reply of the ultimatum was to be given within 12 hours

37. Stephen Green, n. 2, p. 134.

38. Leila S. Kadi, n. 17, p. 95.

39. D.C. Watt (Selected and Introduced) Documents on the Suez Crisis, 26 July to 6 November 1956 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1957), p. 25. The ultimatum was a part of the "operation Musketeer" plan. "Their plan was that Israel would invade the Sinai. As soon as Israeli troops neared the Suez Canal, Britain and France would order Egypt and Israel to withdraw their forces from the Canal Zone in order to permit Anglo-French military units to intervene and occupy the Canal area on the pretext of protecting it from the ravages of war." Fred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1968), p. 214.

by the two governments. In case, they refused to accept their requirements, the Anglo-France forces would intervene "in what^{ever} strength may be necessary to secure compliance." ⁴⁰ As planned, Israeli troops followed the ultimatum and remained at a distance of 10 miles from the canal. But Egypt did not accept the ultimatum. The British and French aircrafts which were operating from Malta and Cyprus, started the bombardment of the Egyptian airfields in the Delta and in the Canal zone exactly after the expiry of stipulated time given in the ultimatum, and consequently an Egyptian frigate was sunk in the Gulf of Suez. It was at this time that President Nasser ordered the blockade of the canal by sinking 47 ships which were filled with concrete so that an absolute blockade ⁴¹ was materialized. On the same day when ultimatum was given on October 30, 1956, a resolution was sponsored by the United States in the security council which urged Israel to withdraw her forces immediately behind the armistice lines. The resolution was voted favourably by the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, Yugoslavia, Persia, and Peru. But Australia and Belgium remained ⁴² absent. But it has vetoed by Britain and France. While addressing the nation through Radio and Television, President Eisenhower stated that : "we believe these actions taken can scarcely be reconciled

40. Ibid.

41. Yaacov Shimon and Eviatar Levine (eds). Political Dictionary of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century (Jerusalem: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), p. 371.

42. Leila S. Kadi, n. 17, p. 96.

with the principles and purposes of the United Nations to which we have all subscribed. And beyond this, we are forced to doubt even if resort to war will for long serve the permanent interests of the attacking nations...There can be no peace - without law.

And there can be no law - if we were to invoke once code of international conduct for those who oppose us and another for our

⁴³ friends." On November 1, Secretary of State Dulles stated in the General Assembly that: "I doubt that any delegates ever spoke from this forum with as heavy a heart as I have brought here tonight. We speak on a matter of vital importance, where the United States finds itself unable to agree with three nations with whom it has ties, deep friendship, admiration and respect, and two of whom constitute our oldest, most trusted and reliable

⁴⁴ allies." The Emergency session of the General Assembly, in which Dulles spoke was proposed by the Yugoslav representative on the ⁴⁵ Security Council, where no member could exercise the veto. On November 2, 1956, the resolution sponsored by the United States, was voted by 64 to 5. The five countries which opposed the resolution were Britain, France, Israel and two British Commonwealth ⁴⁶ countries - Australia and New Zealand. The resolution urged:

43. William R. Polk, The United States and the Arab World (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 378-379.

44. Ibid., p. 379.

45. R.C. Watt, no. 39, p. 26.

46. Leila S. Kadi, n. 17, p. 99.

(1) that all parties involved in hostilities in the area should agree to an immediate cease-fire; (2) the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice line; (3) that all member states should abstain from any act that might delay or prevent the implementation of the resolution; (4) that, upon the cease-fire being effective, steps should be taken to re-open the Suez Canal; and (5) requested the secretary General to observe and report compliance promptly to the security council⁴⁷ and to the General Assembly. On November 3, Britain and France stated that it would reject the resolution unless and until various⁴⁸ conditions imposed by them, were met. They wanted an urgent police action to halt the hostilities which were now posing a threat to the Suez Canal and the action would also pave the way for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli war which was jeopardizing the interests of many countries. Moreover, they said that they would stop military action if the United Nations force was accepted by Egypt and Israel to maintain peace in the area. The United Nations should form a force and maintain it until the Arab-Israeli peace settlement was reached and satisfactory arrangements could be agreed in regard to the Suez Canal under the banner of the United Nations. The Israeli forces had occupied the Gaza strips and the Red Sea islands of Tiran and Sinai and the air attack was continued on the Egyptian territory.⁴⁹

47. Surendra Bhutani, The United Nations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Gurgaon: Academic Press, 1977) p. 50.

48. Leila S. Kadi, n. 17, p. 99.

49. Surendra Bhutani, n. 47, p. 50.

Egypt continued the scuttling of ships in the canal. The Arab commandos destroyed four pumping stations on the pipeline which crossed Syria on its way from Iraq to Tripoli in Lebanon. The Arab solidarity feelings led Saudi Arabia to rupture the diplomatic relations with France and Britain and it also stopped⁵⁰ the supply of Saudi oil to both Britain and France. A resolution was sponsored by Canada in the General Assembly at its session on November 4, 1956. The resolution emphasised that the Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld would formulate a plan for setting up 'an emergency international United Nations force, to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities', abiding the terms of the⁵¹ resolution of November 2, 1956. The next night Hammarskjöld proposed that a United Nations force should be established under General E.L.. Burns, who was already in Palestine as Chief-of-⁵² Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation. It was⁵³ passed by 57 votes to none. When the voting on November 5, 1956 was being carried out in the General Assembly, British and paratroops were landing at the north end of the Suez Canal on the same day, however, both Egypt and Israel ceased the fighting. Meanwhile strongly worded messages were sent by Premier Nikolai Bulganin of

50. Leila S. Kadi, n. 17, p. 99 .

51. United Nations Resolutions on Palestine, 1947-1972, compiled and Classified by Sami Musallam (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1972), p. 32.

52. Surendra Bhutani, n. 46, p. 51 .

53. P.C. Watt, n. 39, p. 28 .

the Soviet Union to Anthony Eden, Guy Mollet, the French President and Ben-Gurion of Israel. The messages stated that: "Russia is fully determined to apply force in order to crush the aggressors and restore peace in the East."⁵⁴ He also communicated the President Eisenhower through the letter, to form a military alliance between U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. in order to end the onslaught of British and French forces on Egypt. The United States immediately rejected the proposal in a White House Statement which read that: "neither Soviet nor any other military forces should now enter the Middle East area except under United Nations mandate... The introduction of new forces under these circumstances would violate the United Nations Charter, and it would be the duty of all United Nations members, including the United States, to oppose any such effort."⁵⁵ At this juncture, the United States pressurised the Anglo-French forces to leave Egypt through stopping the supply of oil.⁵⁶ At the same time, the stability of the pound was also threatened as a consequence of the run on Britain's gold reserves and the United States stated that it would not extend any financial aid unless and until the forces were withdrawn from Egypt.⁵⁷ It was

54. Zeila S. Kadi, n. 17, p. 100.

55. William E. Polk, n. 43, p. 380.

56. Tarun Chandra Bose, n. 3, p. 40.

57. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., John M. Blum (eds.), The National Experience, A History of the United States, (New York: Harcourt Brace & World, Inc., 1963), p. 770.

on November 6, 1956, that Britain and France agreed to cease-fire and accepted the supervision of the United Nations force in the area in Egypt.⁵⁸ It was generally presumed that cessation of Anglo-French hostilities in the Middle East was due to the sincere endeavours of President Eisenhower and his role in fact, was highly appreciated and welcomed. Equally importance was given to the role played by the Soviet Union and it was further opined that Premier Bulganin's warning worked as deterrent to war hysteria in the region. The domestic, economic conditions, political pressures, and falling health of Premier Anthony Eden too contributed for⁵⁹ cessation of hostilities. However, Israel calculated that the war would be confined to the local region alone whereas Washington was considering it in the awesome perspective of East-West conflict and big-power confrontation. The White House and the State Department were antagonized with the Israeli warfare tactics and warned her about the adverse repercussion. While delivering a speech to the Knesset on November 7, David Ben Gurion stated that Israel had achieved the victory and it would not withdraw unless⁶⁰ a peace settlement has made with Egypt. But certain reasons led

58. Nadav Safran, n. 3, p. 243 .

59. Thomas A. Bryson, American Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East, 1784-1975: A Survey (Metuchen, N.J., The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1977), p. 202 .

60. Winston Burdett, Encounter with the Middle East: An Intimate Report on What Lies Behind the Arab-Israeli Conflict (London: Andre Deutsch, 1970), p. 99 .

Ben Gurion to reverse his stand on November 8, 1956. It was on November 7, 1956, a message was sent to the Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion from President Eisenhower which read:

"DEAR MR PRIME MINISTER

As you know, the General Assembly of the United Nations has arranged a cease-fire in Egypt which Egypt, France, the United Kingdom and Israel have agreed. There is being despatched to Egypt a United Nations Force in accordance with pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly that body has urged that all other foreign forces be withdrawn to the General Armistice line. The resolution covering the cease-fire and withdrawal was introduced by the United States and received the overwhelming vote of the Assembly.

Statements attributed to your Government to the effect that Israel does not intend to withdraw from Egyptian territory, as requested by the United Nations, have been called to my attention. I must say frankly, Mr Prime Minister, that the United States views these reports if true, with deep concern. Any such decision by the Government of Israel would seriously undermine the urgent efforts being made by the United Nations to restore peace in the Middle East, and could not but bring about the condemnation of Israel as a violator of the principles as well as the directives of the United Nations.

It is our belief that as a matter of high priority peace should be restored and foreign troops, except for United Nations

forces, withdrawn from Egypt, after which new and energetic steps should be undertaken within the framework of the United Nations to solve the basic problems which have given rise to the present difficulty. The United States has tabled in the General Assembly two resolutions designed to accomplish the latter purposes, and hopes that they will be acted upon favourably as soon as the present emergency has been dealt with.

I need not assure you of the deep interest which the United States has in your/^{Country's} support to Israel in so many ways. It is in this context that I urge you to comply with the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly dealing with the current crisis and to make your decision known immediately. It would be a matter of greatest regret to all my countrymen if Israeli policy on a matter of such grave concern to the world should in any way impair the friendly co-operation between our two countries.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

61

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

On the morning of November 8, Ben-Gurion was apprised of the United Nations General Assembly's resolution which urged Israel to withdraw its forces unconditionally and called for the establishment of the

61. United States Policy in the Middle East, September, 1956 - June, 1957; Documents (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, August, 1957), p. 212.

United Nations Emergency Force to supervise the evacuation. This was voted unanimously by 65 nations. The Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, the Americans, the Russians and the Afro-Asians alike⁶² condemned Israel for threatening world peace. In a meeting at the State Department the officials pleaded that the American aid to Israel be stopped unless and until Israel would comply to the United Nations resolution. This was implied as a sanction on Israel. Three days earlier, on November 5, a letter was already sent from Soviet Premier, Bulganin, in which he accused the Israeli Government of "criminally and irresponsibly toying with the fate of the world and its own people." and of inculcating such hatred as must "bring⁶³ into question the actual existence of Israel as a state." The American pressure and the Soviet threat kept Ben Gurion in a very uncomfortable position. Following a nine hour emergency cabinet meeting on November 8, Ben Gurion announced that Israel was ready to withdraw from Egyptian territory "as and when arrangements have been made in connection with the entry into this area of an international force, which is also to replace British and French⁶⁴ forces into the Suez Canal area." However, it was hoped by Ben-Gurion that Israel's claims might be fulfilled by means of gradual withdrawal. He thought that if there could be a delay in obeying the Assembly's order then with passage of time the world

62. Winston Burdett, n. 60, pp. 99-100.

63. Ibid., p. 100.

64. Keessing's Contemporary Archives, 1955-1956 (London), p. 15208.

might forget about its warfares in the region. Britain and France started evacuating their forces from Egypt which was completed on December 23, 1956 and United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)

entered Egypt to supervise the withdrawals. Israel, however, did not implement its declaration of withdrawal rather it accepted the U.N. order in principle. David Ben Gurion placed two conditions - Israel demanded the guarantee of free navigation through the Straits of Tiran. Secondly, Sinai and Gaza strip should be demilitarized and UNEF should enter the area. Israel made its efforts to get the United States assurance for the guarantee of non-invasion of Israel. But the U.S. administration wanted Israel first to obey the General Assembly's resolution. On February 11, 1957, an aide-memoire was presented by the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to the then Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban in Washington. There would not be any Egyptian interference with Israel's "free and innocent passage" through the Straits of Tiran, if Israeli troops were withdrawn unconditionally from Sharmel-Sheikh. The second point in the aide memoire was that: "with respect to the Gulf of Aqaba and

65. Winston Burdett, n. 60, p. 100.

66. William R. Polk, n. 43, p. 381.

67. Winston Burdett, n. 60, p. 101.

68. Leila S. Kadi, n. 17, p. 102.

69. Theodore Tapper, Israel and World Politics: Roots of the Third Arab-Israeli War (London: Secker & Warburg, 1968), p. 19.

access thereto, the United States believe that the gulf comprehends international waters and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage and to join with others to secure general recognition of the right.

It was of course cleared that the enjoyment of a right of free and innocent passage by Israel would depend upon its prior withdrawal in accordance with the United Nations Resolutions. The United States had no reason to assume that any littoral State would under these circumstances obstruct the right of free and innocent passage. John Foster Dulles in a press conference on November 1, 1957, stated that the U.S. government would give "very serious consideration" to economic sanctions against Israel if the General Assembly would so desire. This statement was criticised by senator William F. Knowland, the leader of the Republican part, in the Senate. He demanded that the U.N. sanctions against Israel should not be supported by the U.S.A. unless the General Assembly would take the similar action against the U.S.S.R. which had ignored the U.N. resolutions condemning Soviet aggressions in Hungary. He further pointed out that to punish Israel while "side stepping the larger aggression" of the Soviet Union in Hungary would be both "immoral" and "insupportable" and this would be considered as the application of a "double standard."⁷¹

70. Ibid.

71. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1957-1958 (London) p. 1542.

Another indication of Opposition came from Senator Lyndon B. Johnson (the Democratic leader in the Senate) who sent a letter to Dulles by press reports that "serious consideration is being given in the U.N. General Assembly to imposing economic sanctions against Israel." Further, he said: "The U.N. cannot apply one rule for the strong and another for the weak, it cannot organise its economic weight against the little state when it has not previously made even a pretence of doing so against the large States. I have seen no suggestions in the U.N. of the application of economic sanctions against the U.S.S.R. Israel has in large part complied with the directives of the United Nations, Russia has not even pretended to be polite..."⁷² On February 19, 1957, when the Senate Democratic Policy Committee meeting was held, it unanimously approved Senator Johnson's letter to the Secretary of State and called upon President Eisenhower to resist any United Nations/^{Attempt} to impose sanction upon Israel.⁷³

On February 20, 1957, in a meeting while explaining the reasons for the American pressure for the Israeli acceptance of the United Nations resolution for the unconditional withdrawal of troops, the President Eisenhower pointed out that the Israeli Government would soon be confronted with the financial crisis if the Export-Import Bank did not help it. The help of the EXIM Bank would be possible only after the restoration of peace. Eisenhower

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

warned the congressmen that the Arabs would increasingly be inclined towards the Soviet Union if Israel did not comply with the U.N. order. Apart from that oil to Britain and Western Europe would be stopped. "And then the whole thing might end up in a general war."⁷⁴ He further stated that he knew the opposition of the Congressmen with regard to the sanctions against Israel. But he emphasized that there was no way to protect American interests in the Middle East and made clear to the members that if the United States could not support the United Nations on the issue of Israel, the principles of the world peace organisation would be jeopardized. The President concluded: "Nobody likes to impose sanctions, but how else can we induce Israel to withdraw to the lines agreed on in the 1949 armistice? The Arabs refuse to discuss a permanent settlement until that move is made."⁷⁵ On March 1, 1957, when U.N. resolution of sanctions on Israel was about to be passed in the General Assembly Israel announced the withdrawal of its forces from Egypt.⁷⁶

It was evident that the United States opposed its allies and Israel mainly because it wanted to delink itself from the tripartite aggression of the powers. Further, it wanted to avoid rest of the world's opinion that the United States was in collusion with the three powers. The United States was compelled to do so as she was antagonised with its allies who had kept her in dark

74. Leila S. Kadi, n. 17, p. 105.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid., p. 110.

about their plans, and Israel had ignored American government's
⁷⁷
 warnings.

However, the United States was aware of the pregnant danger of aggression by France, Britain and Israel. And there was a fear that the direct open attack against President Nasser might set the entire Middle East inflamed. Consequently all the Western positions and interest in the region would be jeopardized and Russia would secure an opportunity to pose itself as sole defender of the Arabs.
⁷⁸
 Such conflict would lead to general war.

The Suez war made Israel derive a greatly improved understanding with the U.S. The Eisenhower Administration continued to uphold the American commitment to resist any attempt to alter by force the territorial and political status quo between the Arab States and Israel. The Secretary of State considered that it was important to solve the Palestine problem for the stability of the area. He believed that if America would co-operate economically and militarily with the Arab States, it would exercise influence on the Arabs and then, in due course, to come to the terms with Israel. In/mean time, it would be in the interest of Israel to refrain from any action of pressing the United States to identify itself openly with Israel. Further, Israel should not
⁷⁹
 protest against every Western gesture towards the Arabs.

77. Nadav Safran, n. 3, p. 243.

78. Ibid., pp. 243-244.

79. Leila S. Fadi, n. 17, pp. 111-112.

CHAPTER-IIIJEWISH LOBBY IN AMERICA

Jewish immigration to the United States resulted in permanent settlement and earned the sympathy of natives because of their religious persecution. The Nazi holocaust where by a massive number of Jews were put to gas chambers during the second world war further earned American sympathy and their skill of hard works in every walks of life was admired and appreciated. Thus, Jews gradually emerged as viable force in economic, social and political spheres of America. Further, Jewish lobby began to¹ influence the American election. The American political system was such that the Jews and the Zionists equally exercised undue influence. This minority pressure groups affected the system considerably, particularly at the time of presidential elections. The national lobby established by ethnic, religious and the minority pressure groups, particularly Jewish - Zionist Israel lobby strengthened their position through the existence of the electoral college. The "Jewish vote" became an important factor in influencing the White House, congress and other elected officials. The Jews took advantage of the system by which the presidents were

1. Sami Hadawi, Bitter Harvest: Palestine between 1914-1967 (New York: The New World Press, 1967), p. 250.

²
 elected. When Harry Truman became the President, the Zionists found very easy to promote their interest. He accepted the Zionist line reluctantly and under pressure, at first, but ultimately accepted it. The State Department finally acquiesced³ his pro-Zionist policy. President Truman made his pro-Israeli policy clear to the American diplomats, who apprised the State Department about the U.S. deteriorating position in the Middle East that: "I am sorry gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism. I do not have⁴ hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents."

President Eisenhower's Administration was neutral when comparing to Truman's Administration as Eisenhower did not bow to the Jewish pressure. Though, it was an election year in 1956, yet he sent the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles to the United Nations to stop the invasion of Egypt by Israel, Britain and France. In 1960's national election Richard Nixon's running mate Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge was to seek the Jewish vote. Addressing in New York to an important Jewish fund raising organisation where he declared: "A very high-level effort to settle Middle East tension is necessary"⁵ He further announced the American support for Israel.

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2. Alfred M. Lilienthal, The Zionist Connection: What Price Peace? (New York: Todd, Mead & Company, 1978), pp. 239-240.
 3. Alfred M. Lilienthal, The Other Side of the Coin: An American Perspective of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1965), p. 277.
 4. Ibid., p. 282.
 5. Alfred M. Lilienthal, n. 2, pp. 535 and 540.

Nixon also stated that if elected he would also endorse Vice-President's efforts to deal with the "problems of Israel's relations with her Arab neighbours."⁶ However, Henry Cabot Lodge had to make apologise as he proved to be instrumental at the United Nations to promote Eisenhower's mission to "stop Israel" action. The democratic party widely distributed the literature that quoted Columnist Drew Pearson that: there is no one in American diplomacy who is considered by the Zionist more anti-Israel than Henry Cabot Lodge." He was further charged to have "championed Nasser and favoured punitive measures against Israel to halt the invasion."⁷ Cleveland's Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver who endorsed the Nixon Lodge ticket tried to refute this charge.⁸ In order to influence the election, the pamphlets which contained the partisan attacks were distributed to the American Jews. In the Jewish news letter, William Zukerman wrote, "No other State which had more at stake in the election than Israel dared take such action. It revealed the curious dogmatic mentality of the Israelis, who seriously looked upon American Jews as their colonial subjects to whom they can give orders in an important election."⁹

Both the presidential candidates, Vice-President Nixon and Senator Kennedy, were quite aware of the forty-five New York State

6. Ibid., p. 540.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., p. 541.

9. Ibid.

electoral votes which were very important and they further indulged in pro and anti-Israeli propaganda. Nixon had sought the support of Ben-Gurion which was pro-Israel organisation and Kennedy also wanted to keep pace with him. Addressing in 1960, to the convention of the Zionist organisation of America in New York, Kennedy pointed out that: "all the authority of the White House to call into Conference the leaders of Israel and of the Arab States to consider privately their common problems." He also noted that "the ideals of Zionism have been endorsed by both parties," so that "friendship¹⁰ for Israel is a national commitment." In his address, he presented and displayed his familiarity with the Zionist idea and dogma started from Theodore Herzl to the present day. The speeches in fact, had been drafted by the Zionist writers.¹¹ In the same convention Nixon too pledged to work for the promotion of Israeli interest and to strengthen Arab-Israeli relations.¹² The pro-Israeli stand taken by the presidential candidates had been described by Nadav Safran, a famous pro-Israel Journalist in his book "The United States and Israel" that: "it is a fact that American Jews have been influenced in their voting behaviour by the attitude taken by political candidates on matters relating to Israel, and that candidates have frequently taken a stand on such matters with an eye to this fact."¹³ Senator Kennedy won the election. It was felt

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Nadav Safran, The United States and Israel (Cambridge; Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 276.

that Kennedy would be working as the real statesman and promote the interest of every American. But this optimism of people was marred as President Kennedy appointed Philip M. Klutznick, the leader of the pro-Israel Brail Birth and the Anti-^{to}Defamation League as U.S. Representative to the U.N. Economic and Social Council. The Senate also confirmed his appointment and he was further entrusted the responsibility for the creation of the vital lobbying group, the Conferences of Presidents of major Jewish organisations. He was pro-Israeli and had intimate ties with both Israel and the Jewish organisations. It showed the intensity of Jewish pressure and Kennedy's inclination towards Israel.¹⁴ As George Lenczowski, a famous author has noted that: "while Department of State had to concern itself with the Middle East as a whole, the White House tended to treat the Zionist problem in isolation from the rest of the area and as a factor of domestic politics."¹⁵

THE LOBBY'S INFLUENCE ON THE CONGRESS

The 'Jewish vote' had a profound impact on the elections of both Senate and the House of representatives. The Jewish vote was such that it eventually became an inevitable factor in American election. It was pointed that: "The legislators may be expected to be continually alive to the imperatives posed by having to get

14. Alfred M. Lilienthal, n. 2, p. 543.

15. A.G. Naidu, U.S. Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New Delhi: Tulsi Publishing House, 1981), p. 66.

re-elected. While striving to retain the support of the majority of votes in their states or the constituencies as the case may be, in order to get re-elected, they will pay attention to the ethnic composition of the voters and avoid taking a position against the interests of various groups. If, a particular minority is so powerful as to cause damage to their re-election prospects, then the members of the Congress will go all out to support the cause of ethnic component. Thus, a majority of the senators and congressmen give importance to any problem that might even remotely effect the interests of Israel.¹⁶

In February 1957, during the Suez Crisis, the Eisenhower Administration was planning to impose economic sanctions against Israel so that it could withdraw its forces from the Sinai Peninsula. The then majority Senate leader, Lyndon B. Johnson who was a Democrat went to the White House and told the Republican President Eisenhower that the Senate would decline to approve such sanctions against Israel and the roles of Secretary of State Dulles and Henry Cabot Lodge were criticised as "unwise, unfair and one sided."¹⁷ In 1960, the United Arab Republic was a contestant seeking a seat in the security council. Two days before the 1960 national elections, four Republican senators, opposed the UAR seeking election to the Security Council. But two

16. Ibid., p. 68.

17. Congressional Record, December 23, 1963, p. 7818.

days before the 1960 national elections, four Republican senators opposed the UAR seeking election to the Security Council. They opposed it because Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser had "persisted in the Suez blockade and in boycotting Israel in violation of U.N. decisions, international convention and the pledged word (SIC) of the United Arab Republic itself."¹⁸ This was opposed in a letter signed by the U.S. senators Hugh Scott (Pennsylvania), Jacob Javits (New York), Kenneth E. Keating (New York) and Clifford P. Case (New Jersey). Two of these senators were in the way to contest the re-election. The Secretary of State Communicated that President Nasser was trying to grab the power in the Middle East and Africa "with the aid of his communist allies. This has been in disputes with Iran, Turkey, Jordan, the Sudan and Tunis."¹⁹ According to George Kent, a foreign policy analyst, the congress favoured Israel more than the Executive Branch because the former was more responsive to the public opinion, whereas the latter was more concerned with the strategic considerations in the Middle East. The congressional interest in Israel was so pervasive that even on such formal occasion as the Israeli independence day it did not miss an opportunity to pass a resolution extending its support to the Jewish State.²⁰

18. Alfred M. Lilienthal, n. 3, p. 296.

19. Ibid.

20. A.C. Naidu, n. 15, pp. 70-71.

THE JEWISH ORGANISATIONS IN AMERICA

There were a number of pro-Jewish organisations in America which lobbied for pro-Israeli policies. The American Israel public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) was registered as Washington's Zionist lobby with the Houses of Congress after its foundation in 1954 and²¹ was headed by I.L. Kenon. In 1956, a Statement on Israel favouring arms assistance and a security guarantee was made. The American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs got it endorsed by 153²² members of the House of Representatives. Besides, AIPAC, the other organisations like American Jewish Committee (AJC), and B'nai B'rith's Anti-Defamation League etc. were founded and began to work as Lobby²³ group of Israel. The American Jewish Congress, the Women's Zionist Organisation (Hadassah), the Zionist organisation of America, United Labour organisation of America (Poale Zish), The Religious Zionist of America (Mizarchi) and the Americans for progressive Israel-Hashomer Hatzair were also active in influencing the American²⁴ political system and foreign policy in favour of Israel.

in
Since the Jewish vote was concentrated/the Urban areas and in large urban states such as New York, the Jewish organisations had exercised tremendous influence in America to extend all the assis-²⁵tance needed by Israel. Apart from these organisations, there were

21. Ibid., p. 71.

22. Barry B. Hughes, The Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1978), p. 179.

23. A.G. Naidu, n. 15, p. 80.

24. Hyman Limer, Zionism: Its Role in World Politics (New York: International Publishers, 1973), p. 59.

25. Barry B. Hughes, n. 22, p. 179.

other important Jewish organisations, which were fund-raising organisations like United Jewish Appeal (UJA), United Israel Appeal (UIA), The Jewish Agency Inc, etc. The United Jewish Appeal was major fund-raising organisation in the United States. It was the chief beneficiary of the numerous Federations and welfare funds taken in the aggregate. U.J.A. was established "for the relief and rehabilitation of Jews or in Europe, Asia, Africa, and any other foreign country or countries (i.e. the function of American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee Inc. (JDC) and for the settlement and welfare of Jews in Palestine (i.e. Zionist purpose)". The contributions given to the UJA were tax-deductible even when the money was given for political purposes. It was however, objected by a well-known writer on foreign Affairs, the late James P. Warburg. In November 1959, when he was delivering a speech, he opposed the use of UJA funds to support Israeli State policy and said: "... it is great mistake for the United Jewish Appeal to refuse - as it has refused for years - to segregate funds contributed for relief or for cultural purposes from funds destined to flow directly or indirectly into the Israeli treasury. I have several times protested against this highhanded procedure; and since I, for one, have been

26. Hyman Lumer, n. 24, p. 63.

27. Moses Lasky, Between Truth and Repose: The World Zionist Organisation: Its Agency for the State of Israel, the Means by which it Raises its Funds and the Structure through which it operates in the Diaspora: A Study in Organisation (San Francisco, California: 1956), pp. 17-18.

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willing to support the Israeli State so long as it pursues some of its present policies. I have had no choice but to discontinue my contribution... Why should all contributions to the United Jewish Appeal be tax-deductible when so large a proportion of them flow directly or indirectly into the hands of a foreign government which openly engages in propaganda attempting to influence the policy of the government of the United States? It seems to me that, unless the United Jewish Appeal changes its policy of mingling all contributions it will sooner or later lose its tax-exempt status, as indeed, in my judgement it should."²⁸

But the tax-exempt status was continued to be retained by the UJA. Even the American Government did not discontinue it so long as the Israeli policies served the American interests. It did not go to find how the UJA used the funds it raised. In fact, the major Jewish organisations whether Zionist or non-zionist were conducive to the policies and programmes of Israel and became instrumental in politics of Israel in America.²⁹ The other organisation United Israel Appeal's original name was United Palestine Appeal, a New York Corporation which was formed in 1927. But in 1953, its nomenclature was changed to "United Israel Appeal Inc." with the purpose to promote the Zionist policy of settling and developing Palestine and to transmit the funds raised: "to the Palestine Foundation Fund (Keren Hayesed Inc.) Ha'assoh (the Women's Zionist Organisation) Jewish National Fund, Inc; and such other Corporations or organisations as

28. Hyman Lumer, n. 24, p. 65.

29. Ibid.

the representatives and agents of the United Palestine Appeal in the attainment of the objects aforementioned shall select." ³⁰ The Jewish Agency Inc. was another New York Corporation which was formed in 1949: One of its purposes was to raise funds and to transmit them" to the Jewish Agency for Palestine in Israel, to the Eretz Israel, Palestine Foundation Fund, Keren Hayesod, Ltd, to the Keren Kayemet Le Israel Ltd, (Jewish National Fund) and to any other organisation or entity organised for the attainment of any of the objects aforementioned and which shall expend such funds and, other property for the purposes her in above setforth." ³¹ The report of the UJA itself said that it was the "fund raising representative of all Zionist parties as well as the Palestine Foundation Fund and the Jewish Agency." ³²

In the Jewish chronicle of London, dated March 13, 1953, an item was published which reported that a meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive was held. It was attended by the American members, Dr S. Nahum Goldmann and Mrs. Rose Halprin, and it was decided that "the American Zionist movement is to renew its political work" through a campaign which was to be arranged "primarily by the newly reorganised Zionist council" in the United States, that "all these activities will be carried out in consultation with the Israeli Foreign Ministry" and that funds will be allocated by the (Jewish) Agency for this purpose." ³³

30. Moses Iasky, n. 27, p. 19.

31. Ibid., pp. 24-25.

32. Ibid., p. 35.

33. Ibid., p. 36.

JEWISH LOBBY ASSAILED

The influence of the Jewish lobby in America was assailed by different important persons who did not want to contest elections. They alleged that the influence would be detrimental to the American interests in the Middle East. President Truman wrote after his retirement about the Zionists pressure exerted on him in favour of creation of a Jewish state in Palestine in the late 1940s that:

"... not only were there pressure movements around the United Nations unlike that had been seen there before, but that the White House, too, was subjected to a constant barrage. I do not think I ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in the instance. The persistence of a few of the extreme Zionist leaders actuated by political motives and engaging in political threats—disturbed me and annoyed me. Some were even suggesting that we pressure sovereign nations into favourable votes in the General Assembly."³⁴

The domestic political pressures on the major political parties which distorted the American national interest in the Middle East was noted in his Diary by James Forrestal, Defense Secretary in the Truman Administration. He wrote that he had told Secretary of State James Brynes: "... I thought it was a most disastrous and regrettable fact that the foreign policy of this country was determined by the contributions a particular bloc of special

34. A.G. Naidu, n. 15, p. 72.

interests might make to the party funds."³⁵

Apart from president Truman there were other succeeding Presidents and members of the Administration who were influenced and they feel such pressure by the U.S. Jewish lobby. For example on May 15, 1962, former President Eisenhower while addressing the students of the Princeton University referred to late Secretary of State Dulles' concern that: "Pressure groups in this country were making it difficult for the government's elective representatives and the executives to carry out their proper missions. He believed that there was too much division; too much divisive influence coming about because of the special interests of these people who had found that by appealing to Congress they could get this or that or the other thing, none of which was particularly of value to the nation as a whole."³⁶ In April 1960, the United Arab Republic black listed American ships that touched the Israeli ports. As a result, International Longshoremen's Association in co-operation with the sea-farers International Union retaliated through unloading the Egyptian oil ship named Cleopatra in the New York harbour.³⁷ The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, criticised the Union's action as "irresponsible private intervention into United States foreign policy making."³⁸ He stated that "actions on the part of individuals or organisations which directly or indirectly with the constitutional exercise of governmental authority

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. New York Times, 26 April 1960.

38. A.C. Naidu, n. 15, p. 75.

or activity in conduct of foreign policy, should be avoided as inimical to the total national interest."³⁹ The Douglas Amendment to the mutual security act was adopted in the Senate. It empowered the President to stop aid to the nation which would not allow the freedom of transit in international water ways. The Douglas Amendment applied the pressure on the UAR to allow Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal.⁴⁰ Senator Fulbright deplored "the existence of a pressure group in the United States which seeks to inject the Arab-Israeli dispute into domestic politics." He further noted that "the amendment would not in fact contribute to the re-opening of the canal to Israeli shipping, but would, on the contrary, tend to prevent the achievement of this desirable objectives an objective which officials of the UN and of our own Government are pursuing with as much attention and preserverance as they possibly can... what it will accomplish is to annoy the Arab and fortify them in their conviction that in any issue arising from the Arab-Israeli controversy, the United States, because of domestic political pressures will be on the side of the Israelis. This Arab conviction for which I regret to say history affords some justification, is the greatest single burden which American diplomacy has to carry in the Middle East."⁴¹ Linking the passage of the Douglas Amendment and the Cleopatra incident he declared it as forcible attempts "which I find disastrous in the

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Alfred M. Lilienthal, n. 3, pp. 289+290.

functioning of our constitutional system. In what is probably the most delicate international situation which exists in the world today, 180 million Americans find their foreign policy being whipsawed by an irresponsible maritime Union and by a minority pressure group. The President cannot conduct our foreign policy in the Middle East under these circumstances. That policy⁴² is being directed by minority pressure groups." Fulbright said: "It is the problem of the development in this nation of organized groups which bring into American political life the trends and emotions that are part of the political conflicts of foreign nations. This is one of the things that our Founding Fathers came to avoid⁴³ when they created this nation." Fulbright further opposed the Israeli supporters and cautioned the American public against the⁴⁴ undesirable friends emerging in their political system.

REASONS FOR JEWISH INFLUENCE

There were about six million American Jews who constituted a small minority. But they lived in the major cities like, New York⁴⁵ Chicago, Philadelphia Los Angeles etc. On the basis of all available surveys of American Jewish communities Ben B. Selligman

42. Ibid., p. 290.

43. Ibid.

44. A.G. Naïdu, n. 15, p. 76.

45. Nadav Safran, n. 13, p. 276.

and Harvey Swados estimated that there were 4,500,000 Jews in
⁴⁶ 1948. However, the figures have been subsequently revised.

Alvin Chenkin, estimated the Jewish population about 5,000,000 in
 the United States in 1955. While examining the same figures of
 Health Insurance Plan (HIP) which conducted the study of the
 population in New York city, Henry Cohen, in a study prepared at
 the conclusion that there were 2,050,000 Jews in New York city in
⁴⁷ 1955. Since New York city estimated to have 40 per cent of American
 Jewry, this would make the total Jewish population in the United
⁴⁸ states 5,285,000 at the beginning of 1960. The Jews were socially
 and geographically mobile. They became educated, entered the
 Middle Class and reformed their religion. As a result, there was
⁴⁹ Jewish continuity and social cohesion in America. In 1957, the
 national data indicated that the Jews were heavily concentrated in
 white-collar job (over three-fourths). It was twice the level of
⁵⁰ the over all white population. The Jews were economically and
⁵¹

46. C. Bezalel Sherman, The Jews Within American Society: A Study in Ethnic Individuality (Detroit: Wayne State University Press 1961), p. 89.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Calvin Goldscheider and Alan S. Zuckerman, The Transformation of the Jews (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 183.

51. Ibid.

and professionally successful. There were a number of leading businessmen who were Jews and they made investments in banking, and stock exchange markets. Thus, they exercised undue influence⁵² in the American society. Moreover, Jews were politically active in the United States and traditionally liberal and voted for the democratic party. Although they constituted less than three per cent of the population in America, yet they casted four per cent⁵³ of more of the votes in the Presidential election. The American Jews also financed the election campaigns of favourable candidates. They gave financial contribution even in those constituencies where there were not considerable numbers of Jewish voters.⁵⁴ There were Philanthropic, religious, political, cultural and educational branches which worked in full co-operation in raising money and extended full political support from all American Jews.⁵⁵ In addition, the Israeli lobby was registered with the United States government which heavily influenced the legislation in favour of Israelis. The AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) won the co-operation of various Jewish and non-Jewish organisations in demonstrating broad grass roots

52. A.G. Naidu, n. 15, pp. 88-89.

53. Ibid., p. 89.

54. Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge; Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 574.

55. Alfred M. Lilienthal, n. 2, p. 207.

support for the position it had sought to advance in congressional
⁵⁶
 bodies. American Jews equally demonstrated their skill and abilities
 even in the mass media as there were a number of prominent Jewish
 Journalists attached to the news papers like The New York Times,
Washington Post, The St Louis Post-Dispatch etc. These papers
 were owned respectively by the Sulzbergers, Eugene Meyer and the
⁵⁷
 pulitzers, a Hungarian Jewish family.

The leading magazines like Commentary, Esquire, Ladies Home
Journal, New York Review of Books, New Yorker, U.S. News World
Report etc., were owned and published by the Jews and had influenced
⁵⁸
 the editorial comments as well.

The Jewish lobby's tremendous influence in the United States,
 thus paved the way for a promotion of perpetual relations between
 America and Israel.

56. Nader Safran, n. 54, p. 574.

57. Alfred M. Lilienthal, n. 2, p. 219.

58. Ibid.

CHAPTER-IVAMERICAN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL

As soon as the State of Israel was established, it had to confront with the economic problems, created by the British colonialism in Palestine. At this crucial movement, the United States came to the rescue of Israel with economic aid. Israel became one of the beneficiaries of American economic assistance but the amount of aid to Israel was quite exceptional in the sense that the aid was perpetual not only by the U.S. Administration but by the people and Jewish organisations as well. The amount of aid flown between 1948-1962 was estimated to be \$810,000,000.¹ American Government did not impose any restrictions on the billion dollars which was donated by the American Jews as tax-exempt "charity".² Without this massive aid which was given and sanctioned by the U.S. Government, Israel would not have developed her economy and even its existence would have been jeopardised.³ There were two ways through which Israel received economic aid from the United States:

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1. Nadav Safran, The United States and Israel (Cambridge; Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 278.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.

- (1) Direct aid given to Israel by the United States Government or its affiliated organisations. Such aid was official and usually announced.
- (2) Indirect aid offered to Israel which further took two forms:
 - (a) Aid extracted from Zionist American institutions and organisations, and from American citizens who participated in campaigns for donation and the selling of bonds.
 - (b) Aid that was emanated from other governments and institutions under the pressure of the United States Government.⁴

DIRECT ECONOMIC AID

The following tale illustrates the direct economic aid received by Israel:

4. Leila S. Kadi, A Survey of American-Israeli Relations (Beirut, Lebanon: Palestine Research Center, 1969), p. 208.

TABLE-I

May 1948 to 1961 (Fiscal Years) (Obligations in \$ millions)

Year	Tech- nical Aid	Spe- cial Asst.	Total MSP Asstt.	DLF	Public Law No. 480			EXIM Bank	IMC	Grand Total
					Title I	Title II	Title III			
1950	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.2	135.00 ^c	-	136.20
1951	-	-	-	-	-	-	21.5	-	-	21.50
1952	0.9	63.5	64.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	64.40
1953	2.5	70.0	72.5	-	-	-	0.04	-	0.9	73.44
1954	1.4	52.5	53.9	-	-	-	20.7	-	2.1	76.70
1955	1.4	39.7 ^b	41.1	-	12.7 ^f	-	0.4	-	2.0	56.20
1956	1.4	25.5 ^d	26.9	-	27.7	-	1.6	-	2.6	58.80
1957	1.7	25.0 ^e	26.7	-	10.5	-	2.3	-	1.5	41.00
1958	1.4	7.5	8.9	15	39.2	-	2.3	27.55 ^g	0.6	93.55
1959	1.6	7.5	9.1	10	38.3	-	1.7	-	0.5	59.60
1960	1.4	7.5	8.9	15	37.6	-	0.5	-	0.3	62.30
1961	1.0	7.5	8.5	16	25.9	-	0.8	35.90	0.3	87.40
Cumu- lative Total Obligat ions.	14.7	306.2	320.9	56	191.9	-	53.04	198.45	10.80	831.09

(a) The development assistance during 1952-1957 includes relief assistance in 1952 and 1953.

(b) Fifty percent (\$20 million) was extended to Israel on a loan basis.

(c) These credits were authorized in calendar year 1949. A total of \$86.4 million of principal has been repaid, leaving the principal outstanding as of June 30, 1961, at \$ 48.6 million.

(d) Includes \$ 5 million of third country currencies of \$ 25.5 million total, \$ 12.5 million was available on a loan basis. (e) of \$ 25 million total, \$10 million was made available on a loan basis. (f) Values are carried at costs to the commodity credit corporation and not at market prices. (g) Includes \$24.2 million for irrigation; \$ 0.35 million for research atomic reactor (has been repaid) and \$3.0 million for privately owned paper mill.

Source: Nadav Safran, The United States and Israel, (Cambridge; Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 306.

ORGANISATIONAL FUNDS

A number of Zionist organisations working in the United States were instrumental in raising the funds and transmitting it to Israel. Harry Ellis illustrated their role in connection with the aid offered to Israel: "By far the most substantial amount of help came from the United States' inception, private American Jewry has contributed at least \$60,000,000 a year through the United Jewish Appeal and another \$50,000,000 through purchase of Israeli bonds. In crisis years these private contributions have soared higher. They form the bedrock of Jewish support on which the Israeli economy depends."⁵ The funds raised by the United Jewish Appeal was sent to Israel. Other private drives which was on behalf of Hadassah, the Hebrew University, Technion, Histadrut, the Weizmann Institute and others were conducted by Israel.⁶

Funds which were tax-free were raised in the United States⁷ and used for Israeli profit-making projects. James Warburg, a prominent financier of the U.S. Jewish community, while commenting on the tax-free funds enquired: "why should all contributions to the United Jewish Appeal be tax-deductible when so large a proportion of them flow directly or indirectly into the hands of a foreign government which openly engages in propaganda attempting to

5. Ibid. p. 211.

6. Ibid., p. 213.

7. Ibid.

influence the policy of the Government of the United States?⁸ The late Henry Hurwitz, a prominent Jewish writer was critical of the method used to raise these tax-free funds. He further commented that: "... as is well known, a very large proportion of the supposedly voluntary philanthropic donations are extracted from business and professional men on threats of punitive economic and social sanctions. This must be described as what it is a species of terrorism. Such terrorism has become a most effective technique in large Jewish fund-raising."⁹ It was in 1958 that Senator E. Flanders of Vermont felt that the donations which went to Israel from the United States as charity were not being utilized for charitable causes. Therefore, he introduced a resolution in the Senate in the following terms:

"whereas the expansion of the population of Israel threatens an added seizure of Arab territory, and

"whereas the over population of Israel is largely financed by tax-free contributions from American citizens;

"Therefore, be it

"Resolved, that the treasury investigate the uses to which tax-free contributions of American citizens are put when sent to Israel, to see whether they tend to exacerbate Middle East turmoil rather than relieve unavoidable distress to the tax-free

8. Sami Hadawi, Bitter Harvest, Palestine 1914-67 (New York: The New World Press, 1967), p. 264.

9. Ibid.

status may be justified or withdrawn.¹⁰

But the draft resolution was not approved by the Senate. Despite these facts, American businessmen, politicians and religious leaders etc. continued to participate in fund-raising¹¹ for Israel.

SALE OF ISRAELI BONDS

After the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, a unique privilege was granted to the Israelis - the privilege of floating bond issues in the United States. This privilege was not given to any other nation. This privilege was resulted in floating of four bond issues since 1951. These were (a) Independence Issue, (b) Development Issue (c) Second Development Issue and (d) Third Development Issue. Sales of the third Development Issue¹² began in March 1964.

Floitation of the Independence Issue for a three-year period, from May 1954 to May 1957, resulted in Sales of \$145.5 million.¹³ Floation of the Second Issue, the Development Issue which was for a five-year period, ranging from 1954 to 1959 resulted in¹⁴ sales of \$234.1 million. In 1959, the interest rate of the two

10. Ibid., pp. 264-265.

11. Leila S. Kadi, n. 4, pp. 214 and 216.

12. Sami Hadawi, n. 8, p. 265.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

Development Issues which was at 4 percent, was urged by the New York representative of the Bonds Organisation to be raised to 4.5 percent.¹⁵ But it was replied from Jerusalem that: "The Ministry of finance and its American advisers are of the opinion that 95 percent of those who purchase these bonds do not even know what interest the bonds bear, hence any changes in the interest rates offered on the new bond will not affect the volume of sales."¹⁶

INDIRECT AID: WEST GERMAN REPARATIONS TO ISRAEL

The most important contributions as the saviour of Israel economically, in 1950's was the Federal Republic of Germany, which concluded an agreement to pay Israel in war reparations.¹⁷ In 1950, the United States Government pressurised the Bonn Government to share the responsibility of maintaining the existence of the State of Israel. In order to be free from the "guilt complex", created by Hitler's crimes against the Jews, West Germany was willing to help Israel financially. So, this weakness and feeling of West Germany was exploited by the United States.¹⁸ This resulted in the conclusion of the reparations agreement between the Bonn Government and the Israeli authorities. It was signed at Luxembourg on

15. Alx Rubner, The Economy of Israel (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1960), p. 20.

16. Ibid.

17. Stephen Green, Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations with a Militant Israel (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1984), p. 82.

18. Leila S. Kadi, n. 4, p. 217.

September 10, 1952, Konard Adenauer and Moshe Sharett, then Israeli Foreign Minister.¹⁹ The agreement ranged from 10 September 1952 to 16 March 1965. After the signing of the agreement a press statement was given by Moshe Sharett. He declared that the German Israeli agreement was "unique in the annals of International relations ... as it was the first time that a great people has spontaneously accepted the obligation to contribute to the reparations of crimes committed under a previous regime."²⁰ A report was issued by the foreign office of West Germany that in pursuance of the 1952 agreement, West Germany had paid a total of 3450 million Marks (\$ 862.5 million)²¹ between 1952 and 1965. As the end of the 1952 agreement was approaching and Israeli financial needs increasing, the United States once again pressurized the West Germany in 1960. The then Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion and the late Chancellor Konard Adenauer visited New York where they reached a semi-secret agreement. The terms of the agreement was concluded - but later denied by the West German Government - to involve in the payment by West Germany to Israel of \$500,000,000²² within ten years. Additionally, individual indemnification was also made. According to the New York Times, in 1959 alone,

19. Ibid.

20. Keenleyside's Contemporary Archives, 1952-1954 (London), p. 12621.

21. Ibid., 1965-1966, p. 21439.

22. Sami Hadawi, n. 8, p. 268.

"about \$ 60,000,000 in individual restitution and indemnification payments have been sent to Israel." The paper estimated that "nearly 400,000 claims for individual damages have been filed by Israelis", it disclosed that "Since the first payments began in 1954, a total of \$186,000,000 has been granted. At least \$250,000,000 more is hoped for (in Israel) before the West German Government's programme is finished." The Newspaper explained that "the individual payments are made for personal injuries, for time spent in concentration camps for loss of earning ability, or for loss of professional careers resulting from Nazi actions. They are also made for loss of personal and business property."²³

Bentwich Characterised the upgrade of Israel's economy in 1954 as follows:

"... the most radical improvement in Israel's economic position... is due not to her increased productivity, but to the regular delivery of reparations by the Federal German Government."²⁴

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

The United States Government had always pretended to be impartial towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict. In spite of the positive and neutral declarations and statements, the American

23. The New York Times, October 18, 1959.

24. Galina Nikitina, The State of Israel: A Historical Economic and Political Study (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), p1209.

attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict by and large had been proved to be pro-Israel, particularly, in the field of arms. The United States did not object to the smuggling of arms and ammunitions to the Zionist underground terrorists in Palestine, and also did not impose any restriction on the tax-free donations that were used for the purchase of illicit arms from Czechoslovakia²⁵ and other communist countries. It was firmly believed by the Arabs that the U.S. Administration decided to sell the military equipment to Israel just because of the Zionist pressure and the²⁶ existing Jewish vote in America.

After the creation of the State of Israel the U.S. adopted the policies for arming Israel-which are as follows:

- (1) The United States furnished Israel secretly with military equipment. On July 23, 1952 the United States Government agreed to supply Israel with military equipment which Israel had been unable to acquire except from private American²⁷ sources. On May 23, the New York Times reported that "Israel is beginning to receive a small but steady flow of weapons from Britain, France and the United States." And on September 19, 1953, United States News and World Report reported that

25. Sami Hadawi, n. 8, p. 257.

26. Ibid., p. 258.

27. Leila S. Kadi, n. 4, p. 221.

"arms which United States Government has now agreed to²⁸
furnish Israel consist mainly of anti-tank guns."

- (2) The United States encouraged Canada, England, France and West Germany to supply Israel arms and ammunition. On March 2, 1956, the United States Government was urged by Moshe Sharett, the Foreign Minister of Israel, for a definite answer regarding the Israel's request for military aid from the United States. And on April 3, 1956, the United States answered through the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, who stated that the United States Government maintained a policy of neutrality and non-involvement in the Arab-Israeli arms race. However, Dulles said that such United States' attitude does not mean that Israel's request was rejected, or that the United States had any "objection to the sale of arms to Israel by other²⁹ Western countries." On September 3, 1958, it was announced by the State Department that an undisclosed quantity of United States arms had been sold to Israel "in recent months". However, the Egyptian reports that weapons worth between \$40 million and \$50 million had been involved in³⁰ the transaction.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., p. 222.

30. Ibid., p. 221.

In 1965, it was disclosed by the State Department Spokesman, Robert Mc Closkey, that the United States Government had in 1960, encouraged the sale of arms to Israel by the West German Government. On the day of disclosure, it was revealed that at least 80 percent³¹ of the shipment had already been delivered. However, writing on February 5, 1965, in the semi-official Cairo newspaper, Al-Ahram, Mohammad Haikal - one of President Nasser's closest advisers, and often regarded as the President's unofficial press spokesman - claimed that the supply of West German arms to Israel under the 1960 agreement was the basic cause for the deterioration of relations between Cairo and Bonn. In a strong attack on the West-German Government, Haikal said, that the Federal Republic had "without justification taken a hostile act against the entire Arab nation", adding that it was very doubtful whether President Nasser would "consent to visit the capital of a country whose statesmen present Israel with weapons." (President Nasser had been invited in November 1964 to visit Bonn, after the first disclosures of the 1960 agreement had already appeared in the West³² German press). However, further arms shipments were suspended³³ following president Nasser's denunciation.

31. Keessing's Contemporary Archives, 1965-1968 (London), p. 20737.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., p. 20738.

The United States Government's support could be traced to March 1960 when an unofficial visit was paid by David Ben Gurion to the United States. On March 10, he talked for two hours with President Eisenhower at the White House and told the President about the fear that the Soviet Union was building up the United Arab Republic's armament to a dangerous level and about his hope that an arrangement (could be reached with the Soviet Union) to put an end to this build up. He cleared that he could see the danger of Soviet violations in any arrangement that led to an international embargo on arms shipment to the Middle East.³⁴ Consequently, the New York Herald Tribune reported that: "the United States has given Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion assurances that this country's (U.S.) policy is to oppose any change in the Middle East status quo by force of arms." And it was on May 3, 1960, responding the Journalist's questions, the United States Defense and State Department officials declared that Israel had been allowed to buy modest quantities of U.S.³⁵ weapons.

Thus the United States directly or indirectly aided Israel not only in economic sphere but military sphere as well.

34. The New York Times, March 11, 1960.

35. Leila S. Kadi, n. 4, p. 223.

CONCLUSION

The creation of Israel was the result of generosity and sympathy shown by Americans towards the Jews all over the world. The sympathy for victims of Nazi holocaust and the bond between the American Jews and Christians further strengthened the proposition for the existence of Israel. Eventually, it became obligatory on the part of the U.S. Government to defend Israel in its every sphere of life and thus, the process of relations between the two countries has been perpetually strengthened. A year after the conclusion of the armistice agreements, which were signed in May 1949, the United States saw no peace settlement. Consequently, America took the initiative to put a Western guarantee behind the armistice settlement to ensure the security of Israel. It was in early 1950 that Israel sought arms from the U.S. Administration to counter the shipments that were being made by Britain to some of the Arab States by virtue of outstanding treaties. Though, the U.S. Government was sympathetic to the needs of Israel yet it felt the threat of renewed war due to the development of arms race in the Middle East. So, when the United States consulted the British and French representatives, who were the traditional arms suppliers of the area, a Tripartite Declaration was issued. The Declaration mainly pledged that the three powers would not permit any armed aggression across the

existing armistice lines in Palestine, otherwise, they would take appropriate action against the aggressor, "both within and outside the United Nations." The second pledge was that they would maintain a balance in the supply of arms to Israel and the Arab States and to prevent the creation of any "unbalance" that would endanger peace in the region. With the Declaration, the British, French and the United States Governments involved promise to act as guardians of the State of Israel, and to strive to maintain the status quo in the Middle East.¹

Israel's existence as a strong pro-west state was in the national strategic interests of the United States. In any major confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Middle East over oil or for any other reason Israel could be used as a key defense point by the United States. It could serve as a supply depot, a refuelling base, and a tactical support for American military force.² At the same time the countries of the Middle East were also economically viable for the United States in the sense that the Americans would get abandoned opportunities for investment in the Arab world. Further, it wanted to contain communism in the region.

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1. Leila S. Kadi, A Survey of American-Israeli Relations (Beirut: Palestine Research Center, 1969), pp. 49-50.
 2. Philip L. Groisser, The United States and the Middle East (New York: The State University of New York, Albany), 1982), pp. 182-183.

In order to bring Egypt, which was geographically an African State and politically West Asian one, in fold, the Americans extended aid for the construction of Aswan High Dam. But the aid could not be lent as president Gamal Abdel Nasser sought foreign policy of non-alignment, and became one of the architects of this new born movement in the third world. After nationalisation of the Suez Canal, he emerged as a strong leader and finally the Soviet Union assisted him to cease the aggression. America recognised the delicacy of the situation because not only communism was about to pervade but also the U.S. interests in the Middle East appeared to be jeopardised. The Eisenhower administration inspite of the pro-Israeli congressional members and Jewish lobby, compelled Israel to cease aggression. No doubt, at that time the relations between the U.S. and Israel were strained. But after the end of the Suez crisis both the countries developed a mutual and more friendly understanding and the process normalisation of relations further accelerated. The most contributing factor to the U.S. favourable policy towards Israel was the Jewish lobby and Jewish vote which played the most important role in the presidential as well as the congressional elections. In 1960, John F. Kennedy won the election as the President of the United States by dint of the Jewish patronage. There were many Jewish organisations in the United States which affected the politics of America. American

Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) was one of the such important organisations which had a considerable influence on the legislation. The other important organisations like American Jewish Congress, Hadassah (the Women's Zionist Organisation of America) etc. dominated in the governmental decision making.

Apart from the Jewish Organisations, the American Jews did contribute significantly not only in financial sphere but in the entire process of economy as well. It was in the beginning of 1950 s that Jewish era was conspicuous in America as a number of Jews were found in governmental services, in Universities, in trade and commerce and even in Science and technological spheres. The Jews integrated themselves in American way of life and culture and by and large other Americans considered the problem of the Israel as their own and extended every possible support for the survival of Israel as a nation in the world community.

Since the Jewish community became an inevitable factor in American way of life, every Administration whether it is republican or democratic, strengthened and accelerated the process of relations between America and Israel.

APPENDIX-I

(Letter)

President Eisenhower to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion

March 2, 1957

My dear Mr Prime Minister:

I was indeed deeply gratified at the decision of your Government to withdraw promptly and fully behind the Armistice lines as set out by your Foreign Minister in her address of yesterday to the General Assembly. I venture to express the hope that the carrying out of these withdrawals will go forward with the utmost speed.

I know that this decision was not an easy one. I believe, however, that Israel will have no cause to regret having thus conformed to the strong sentiment of the World Community as expressed in the various United Nations Resolutions relating to withdrawal.

It has always been the view of this Government that after the withdrawal there should be a United effort by all of the nations to bring about conditions in the area more stable, more tranquil, and more conducive to the general welfare than those which existed heretofore. Already the United Nations General Assembly has adopted Resolutions which presage such a better

future. Hopes and expectations based thereon were voiced by your Foreign Minister and others. I believe that it is reasonable to entertain such hopes and expectations and I want you to know that the United States, as a friend of all of the countries of the area and as a loyal member of the United Nations will, seek that such hopes prove not to be vain.

Source: Robert I. Branyan, Lawrence H. Larsen,
The Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1961: A Documentary History, (New York: Random House, Inc., 1971), p. 704.

APPENDIX-II

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENCE

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL RICHARD COLLINS, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (JCS) AUG. 17, 1956.

SUBJECT: Emerging Pattern - Arab-Israeli Situation

In reviewing the intelligence on developments in the Middle East, it appears that the dilemma confronting the Israelis has grown more difficult during the current Suez Crisis. If Nasr emerges with increased prestige, Pan-Arabism will have been given a powerful boost which could pose an overwhelming threat to the continued existence of Israel.

Ben-Gurion must, under the conditions indicated above, be seriously considering the feasibility of a Preventive War aimed at stalling the rate of Arab cohesion. It is my feeling that a forecast on Israel's probable course of action for the short term is required policy decisions in the Department of Defense. I would very much appreciate it if the Joint Intelligence Group would undertake to provide such a forecast to support policy decisions of the Secretary of Defense. This paper would be most useful if discussed the validity of the assumptions indicated above and then

addressed itself to the following questions:

- a. What is the probability of an Israeli attack?
- b. If considered probable, when is this decision likely to taken?
- c. What are the likely objectives of such an attack?
- d. What is the probability of U.K. instigation of such attack?

The forecast along these lines would be particularly useful if it could be made available by Wednesday, 22 August 1956.

Signed

G. B. ERSKINE
General, USMC (Ret)
Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense
(Special operations)

ENCLOSURE

EMERGING PATTERN - ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

1. Deterring factors to possible aggressive action by the Israelis are the lack of international popular support, the deterrent provisions of the U.N. mandate and the Tri-Partite Agreement, and the fact that Israel would run the risk of having

economic sanctions imposed on her by the U.N. In addition, Israel may possibly realize that, in spite of local victories and attainment of her objectives, the war would not end in peace but would continue indefinitely.

2. In view of the various factors regarding the initiation of a "Preventive" war by Israel in the short-term it is concluded that:

a. The Suez Canal crisis has substantially increased the rise of aggressive hostile action by Israel. This is by virtue of the fact that Nasser's power and prestige will have reached such heights in the even he is successful that Israel may eventually be overwhelmed and also because the major restraining powers are intensely preoccupied with Egypt and the Canal. It should be noted, in this connection, that there is a possibility that the United Kingdom and France may not uphold the Tri-partite Declaration of 1950 in this situation.

b. Probable objectives of an Israeli attack on Egypt capable of being attained in the necessarily short blitzkreig type of war are:

- (1) To induce the downfall of Nasser and his regime.
- (2) To administer a defeat to Egypt to shutter the increased prestige it may have received as a result of the settlement of the Suez crisis.

- (3) To reduce the military potential (especially air) of Egypt. (We estimate Israeli superiority until November 1956 after which it swings to the Egyptians)
- (4) To refocuss the attention of the world on the need for final solution of the Arab-Israel problem.
- (5) To gain territorial objectives such as border rectification and expansion limited to the Gaza strip, west Jordan, and strategic points on the Gulf of Aqaba.
- (6) To effect a forced relocation of nearby Arab refugee camps.

c. In the event that the United Kingdom and France become militarily engaged against the Egyptians, there is a definite possibility that Israel, without some form of Western restraint, might attempt to capitalize on the situation by associating herself with Allied actions through concurrent attack on Egypt and Egyptian. Allies.

d. There are no indications at present of prepared for by the Israelis in the immediate future, however, the pattern of continuous skirmishes, from which large-scale hostilities could grow, remain unbroken,


e. The probability of United Kingdom instigation is considered small unless the British become hopelessly bogged down militarily

in Egypt which is considered unlikely. By such action Britain, in return for a few quick victories, would suffer substantial losses in position and prestige in the long term, particularly in the Arab world.


Source: Stephen Green, Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations with a Militant Israel (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1984), pp. 332-334.

APPENDIX-III

MAP
I



M A P
II



Source: Dewan Berindranath, War and Peace in West Asia,
(New Delhi: Topical Publications, 1969).

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